Congress Overwhelmed
“Congress Overwhelmed brings together the leading experts on Congress to address a critical issue facing American democracy: what can be done to ensure that Congress fulfills its role as a coequal branch in our political system? The volume provides a clear and compelling account of the many challenges facing today’s congress and offers valuable lessons for reformers seeking to improve the legislative branch’s capacity.”
Eric Shickler, University of California, Berkeley
Revolving Door Lobbying
“Revolving Door Lobbying is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the real reasons why Washington stopped working, and why those with resources to hire the best lobbyists keep winning, even without having to bribe anybody.”
Lee Drutman, author of The Business of America is Lobbying: How Corporations Became Politicized and Politics Became More Corporate
Publications
More than Mere Access: An Experiment on Moneyed Interests, Information Provision, and Legislative Action in Congress
Author(s): Alexander C Furnas, Timothy M LaPira, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Lee Drutman, Kevin Kosar
Published in: Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2023
Abstract:
Campaign donors and corporate interests have greater access to Congress, and the legislative agenda and policy outcomes reflect their preferences. How this privileged access converts into influence remains unclear because petitioner-legislator interactions are unobserved. In this article, we report the results of an original survey experiment of 436 congressional staffers. The vignette manipulates a petitioner’s identity, the substance of the request, and the supporting evidence being offered. We test how likely staff are to take a meeting, to use the information being offered, and to recommend taking a position consistent with the request, as well as whether they perceive the request to be congruent with constituent preferences. Donors and lobbyists are no more likely to be granted access than constituents, but staffers are more likely to use information and to make legislative action recommendations when the information source is an ideologically aligned think tank. Subgroup analysis suggests these effects are particularly strong among ideological extremists and strong partisans. And, information offered by aligned think tanks are thought to be representative of constituent opinion. Our results reveal the partisan and ideological predispositions that motivate legislative action that is more costly than merely granting access.
Partisan Competition and the Decline in Legislative Capacity among Congressional Offices
Author(s): Jesse M Crosson, Alexander C Furnas, Timothy Lapira, Casey Burgat
Published in: Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2021
Abstract:
Since the 1990s, members of the House have shifted resources away from legislative functions to representational activities. We reveal this decline using an original dataset constructed from 236,000 quarterly payroll disbursements by 1,090 member offices for 120,000 unique staff between the 103rd and 113th Congresses, as well as interviews with former members and staff in Congress. These data allow us to test two plausible alternative explanations, one rooted in the centralization of legislative power over time and the other in conservatives’ desires to contract government power. We show that the decline in legislative capacity is symmetrical between and consistent within both parties, contrary to expectations rooted in asymmetrical, ideological sabotage.
