| 
|
|
Quotes on Power
and Politics
|
Power, wherever lodged, is liable, more or less, to abuse.
In governments organized on Republican principles it is necessarily
lodged in the majority…
Letter to Thomas Lehre (not sent),
August 2d, 1828 (Madison,
1865, III, page 635)
The essence of Government is power; and power, lodged as
it must be in human hands, will ever be liable to abuse.
Speech in the Virginia State Convention
of 1829-'30, on the Question of the Ratio of Representation
in the two Branches of the Legislature, December 2, 1829 (Madison,
1865, IV, page 51)
In all Governments there is a power which is capable of oppressive
exercise.
Notes on Suffrage, written at different
periods after his retirement from public life (Madison,
1865, IV, page 23)
Although the old idea of a compact between the Government
and the people be justly exploded, the idea of a compact among
those who are parties to a Government is a fundamental principle
of free Government.
Letter to N. P. Trist, Feb. 15, 1830
(Madison,
1865, IV, page 63)
The two vital characteristics of the political system of
the United States are, first, that the Government holds its
powers by a charter granted to it by the people; second, that
the powers of government are formed in two grand divisions
— one vested in a Government over the whole community,
the other in a number of independent Governments over its
component parts. Hitherto charters have been written grants
of privileges by Governments to the people. Here they are
written grants of power by the people to their Governments.
Supplement to the letter of November
27, 1830, to A. Stevenson (Madison,
1865, IV, pages 138-139)
Representation and Leadership
The conduct of every popular assembly…shews that individuals
join without remorse in acts against which their consciences
would revolt, if proposed to them, separately, in their closets.
Letter to Thomas Jefferson, October
24, 1787 (Madison,
1865, I, page 352)
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own
cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment,
and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay
with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges
and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most
important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations,
not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning
the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different
classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes
which they determine?
Federalist
No. 10
Who would rely on a fair decision from three individuals
if two had an interest in the case opposed to a third? Make
the number as great as you please. the impartiality will not
be increased…
Notes on Suffrage, written at different
periods after his retirement from public life (Madison,
1865, IV, page 23)
Large districts are manifestly favorable to the election
of persons of general respectability and of probable attachments
to the rights of property, over competitors depending on the
personal solicitations practicable on a contracted theatre…
Notes on Suffrage, written at different
periods after his retirement from public life (Madison,
1865, IV, page 27)
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be,
first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to
discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the
society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual
precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue
to hold their public trust.
Federalist
No. 57
A representative of the United States must be of the age
of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a citizen
of the United States; must, at the time of his election, be
an inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during
the time of his service, must be in no office under the United
States. Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this
part of the federal government is open to merit of every description,
whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without
regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession
of religious faith.
Federalist
No. 52
It is a sound and important principle that the representative
ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances
of his constituents. But this principle can extend no further
than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority
and care of the representative relate.
Federalist
No. 56
No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to
an upright intention and a sound judgment a certain degree
of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to legislate.
A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information
which lie within the compass of men in private as well as
public stations. Another part can only be attained, or at
least thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station
which requires the use of it. The period of service, ought,
therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the
extent of practical knowledge requisite to the due performance
of the service.
Federalist
No. 53
[I]n all legislative assemblies the greater the number composing
them may be, the fewer will be the men who will in fact direct
their proceedings.
Federalist
No. 58
This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the
most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution
can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining
a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect
every just and salutary measure.
Federalist
No. 58
Large districts are manifestly favorable to the elections
of persons of general respectability and probable attachment
to the rights of property, over competitors depending on the
personal solicitations practicable on a contracted theatre.
Notes on Suffrage, written at different
periods after his retirement from public life (Madison,
1865, IV, page 27)
The tendency of a longer period of service would be to render
the body more stable in its policy, and more capable of stemming
popular currents taking a wrong direction, till reason and
justice could regain their ascendancy.
Notes on Suffrage, written at different
periods after his retirement from public life (Madison,
1865, IV, page 27)
[A]ttempts to enforce by legal sanctions, acts obnoxious
to go great a proportion of Citizens, tend to enervate the
laws in general, and to slacken the bands of Society.
Memorial
and Remonstrance, 1785
A sanction is essential to the idea of law, as coercion is
to that of Government.
Notes
on the Confederacy—April, 1787
As far as laws are necessary to mark with precision the duties
of those who are to obey them, and to take from those who
are to administer them a discretion which might be abused,
their number is the price of liberty. As far as laws exceed
this limit they are a nuisance; a nuisance of the most pestilent
kind.
Notes
on the Confederacy—April, 1787
[T]he facility and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases
to which our governments are most liable…
Federalist
No. 62
[A] continual change even of good measures is inconsistent
with every rule of prudence and every prospect of success.
Federalist
No. 62
Parties
No free country has ever been without parties, which are
a natural offspring of freedom.
Notes on Suffrage, written at different
periods after his retirement from public life (Madison,
1865, IV, page 24)
Parties, under some denominations or another, must always
be expected in a government as free as ours. When the individuals
belonging to them are intermingled in all parties of the whole
country, they strengthen the union of the whole while they
divide every part. Should a state of parties arise founded
on geographical boundaries, and other physical and permanent
distinctions which happen to coincide with them, what is to
control these great repulsive masses from awful shocks against
each other?
Letter to Robert Walsh, November
27, 1819 (Madison,
1865, III, page1 57)
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are
united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or
of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to
the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
Federalist
No. 10
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed
Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than
its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.
Federalist
No. 10
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because
his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably,
corrupt his integrity.
Federalist
No. 10
So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual
animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself,
the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient
to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most
violent conflicts
Federalist
No. 10
[T]he propensity of all single and numerous assemblies [is]
to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and
to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious
resolutions.
Federalist
No. 62
A Government like ours has so many safety-valves,
giving vent to overheated passions, that it carries within itself
a relief against the infirmities from which the best of human
Institutions cannot be exempt.
Letter to General La Fayette, November
25, 1820 (Madison,
1865, III, pages 189-191)
|
|
|
