Objection That The Number
of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population
Demands Considered
To the People of the State of New York:
THE remaining charge against the House of Representatives,
which I am to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the
number of members will not be augmented from time to time, as
the progress of population may demand.
It has been admitted, that this objection, if
well supported, would have great weight. The following observations
will show that, like most other objections against the Constitution,
it can only proceed from a partial view of the subject, or from
a jealousy which discolors and disfigures every object which
is beheld.
1. Those who urge the objection seem not
to have recollected that the federal Constitution will not suffer
by a comparison with the State constitutions, in the security
provided for a gradual augmentation of the number of representatives.
The number which is to prevail in the first instance is declared
to be temporary. Its duration is limited to the short term of
three years (see Constitution
1.2.3).
Within every successive term of ten years a census
of inhabitants is to be repeated (see Constitution
1.2.3).
The unequivocal objects of these regulations are, first, to
readjust, from time to time, the apportionment of representatives
to the number of inhabitants, under the single exception that
each State shall have one representative at least; secondly,
to augment the number of representatives at the same periods,
under the sole limitation that the whole number shall not exceed
one for every thirty thousand inhabitants. If we review the
constitutions of the several States, we shall find that some
of them contain no determinate regulations on this subject,
that others correspond pretty much on this point with the federal
Constitution, and that the most effectual security in any of
them is resolvable into a mere directory provision.
2. As far as experience has taken place on this
subject, a gradual increase of representatives under the State
constitutions has at least kept pace with that of the constituents,
and it appears that the former have been as ready to concur
in such measures as the latter have been to call for them.
3. There is a peculiarity in the federal Constitution
which insures a watchful attention in a majority both of the
people and of their representatives to a constitutional augmentation
of the latter. The peculiarity lies in this, that one branch
of the legislature is a representation of citizens (see
Constitution
1.2), the other of the
States (see Constitution
1.3):
in the former, consequently, the larger States will have most
weight; in the latter, the advantage will be in favor of the
smaller States. From this circumstance it may with certainty
be inferred that the larger States will be strenuous advocates
for increasing the number and weight of that part of the legislature
in which their influence predominates. And it so happens that
four only of the largest will have a majority of the whole votes
in the House of Representatives. Should the representatives
or people, therefore, of the smaller States oppose at any time
a reasonable addition of members, a coalition of a very few
States will be sufficient to overrule the opposition; a coalition
which, notwithstanding the rivalship and local prejudices which
might prevent it on ordinary occasions, would not fail to take
place, when not merely prompted by common interest, but justified
by equity and the principles of the Constitution.
It may be alleged, perhaps, that the Senate would
be prompted by like motives to an adverse coalition; and as
their concurrence would be indispensable, the just and constitutional
views of the other branch might be defeated. This is the difficulty
which has probably created the most serious apprehensions in
the jealous friends of a numerous representation. Fortunately
it is among the difficulties which, existing only in appearance,
vanish on a close and accurate inspection. The following reflections
will, if I mistake not, be admitted to be conclusive and satisfactory
on this point.
Notwithstanding the equal authority which will
subsist between the two houses on all legislative subjects,
except the originating of money bills (see
Constitution
1.7), it cannot be doubted
that the House, composed of the greater number of members, when
supported by the more powerful States, and speaking the known
and determined sense of a majority of the people, will have
no small advantage in a question depending on the comparative
firmness of the two houses.
This advantage must be increased by the consciousness,
felt by the same side of being supported in its demands by right,
by reason, and by the Constitution; and the consciousness, on
the opposite side, of contending against the force of all these
solemn considerations.
It is farther to be considered, that in the gradation
between the smallest and largest States, there are several,
which, though most likely in general to arrange themselves among
the former are too little removed in extent and population from
the latter, to second an opposition to their just and legitimate
pretensions. Hence it is by no means certain that a majority
of votes, even in the Senate, would be unfriendly to proper
augmentations in the number of representatives.
It will not be looking too far to add, that the
senators from all the new States may be gained over to the just
views of the House of Representatives, by an expedient too obvious
to be overlooked. As these States will, for a great length of
time, advance in population with peculiar rapidity, they will
be interested in frequent reapportionments of the representatives
to the number of inhabitants. The large States, therefore, who
will prevail in the House of Representatives, will have nothing
to do but to make reapportionments and augmentations mutually
conditions of each other; and the senators from all the most
growing States will be bound to contend for the latter, by the
interest which their States will feel in the former.
These considerations seem to afford ample security
on this subject, and ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and
fears which have been indulged with regard to it. Admitting,
however, that they should all be insufficient to subdue the
unjust policy of the smaller States, or their predominant influence
in the councils of the Senate, a constitutional and infallible
resource still remains with the larger States, by which they
will be able at all times to accomplish their just purposes.
The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone
can propose, the supplies requisite for the support of government
(see Constitution
1.7). They, in a word,
hold the purse that powerful instrument by which we behold,
in the history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble
representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere
of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far
as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of
the other branches of the government. This power over the purse
may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual
weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives
of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and
for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.
But will not the House of Representatives be as
much interested as the Senate in maintaining the government
in its proper functions, and will they not therefore be unwilling
to stake its existence or its reputation on the pliancy of the
Senate? Or, if such a trial of firmness between the two branches
were hazarded, would not the one be as likely first to yield
as the other? These questions will create no difficulty with
those who reflect that in all cases the smaller the number,
and the more permanent and conspicuous the station, of men in
power, the stronger must be the interest which they will individually
feel in whatever concerns the government. Those who represent
the dignity of their country in the eyes of other nations, will
be particularly sensible to every prospect of public danger,
or of dishonorable stagnation in public affairs. To those causes
we are to ascribe the continual triumph of the British House
of Commons over the other branches of the government, whenever
the engine of a money bill has been employed. An absolute inflexibility
on the side of the latter, although it could not have failed
to involve every department of the state in the general confusion,
has neither been apprehended nor experienced. The utmost degree
of firmness that can be displayed by the federal Senate or President,
will not be more than equal to a resistance in which they will
be supported by constitutional and patriotic principles.
In this review of the Constitution of the House
of Representatives, I have passed over the circumstances of
economy, which, in the present state of affairs, might have
had some effect in lessening the temporary number of representatives,
and a disregard of which would probably have been as rich a
theme of declamation against the Constitution as has been shown
by the smallness of the number proposed. I omit also any remarks
on the difficulty which might be found, under present circumstances,
in engaging in the federal service a large number of such characters
as the people will probably elect. One observation, however,
I must be permitted to add on this subject as claiming, in my
judgment, a very serious attention. It is, that in all legislative
assemblies the greater the number composing them may be, the
fewer will be the men who will in fact direct their proceedings.
In the first place, the more numerous an assembly may be, of
whatever characters composed, the greater is known to be the
ascendancy of passion over reason. In the next place, the larger
the number, the greater will be the proportion of members of
limited information and of weak capacities. Now, it is precisely
on characters of this description that the eloquence and address
of the few are known to act with all their force. In the ancient
republics, where the whole body of the people assembled in person,
a single orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen
to rule with as complete a sway as if a sceptre had been placed
in his single hand. On the same principle, the more multitudinous
a representative assembly may be rendered, the more it will
partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings of
the people. Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion
the slave of sophistry and declamation. The people can never
err more than in supposing that by multiplying their representatives
beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the barrier against
the government of a few. Experience will forever admonish them
that, on the contrary, AFTER SECURING A SUFFICIENT NUMBER FOR
THE PURPOSES OF SAFETY, OF LOCAL INFORMATION, AND OF DIFFUSIVE
SYMPATHY WITH THE WHOLE SOCIETY, they will counteract their
own views by every addition to their representatives. The countenance
of the government may become more democratic, but the soul that
animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be enlarged,
but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs
by which its motions are directed.
As connected with the objection against the number
of representatives, may properly be here noticed, that which
has been suggested against the number made competent for legislative
business. It has been said that more than a majority ought to
have been required for a quorum; and in particular cases, if
not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision.
That some advantages might have resulted from such a precaution,
cannot be denied. It might have been an additional shield to
some particular interests, and another obstacle generally to
hasty and partial measures. But these considerations are outweighed
by the inconveniences in the opposite scale. In all cases where
justice or the general good might require new laws to be passed,
or active measures to be pursued, the fundamental principle
of free government would be reversed. It would be no longer
the majority that would rule: the power would be transferred
to the minority. Were the defensive privilege limited to particular
cases, an interested minority might take advantage of it to
screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal,
or, in particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable indulgences.
Lastly, it would facilitate and foster the baneful practice
of secessions; a practice which has shown itself even in States
where a majority only is required; a practice subversive of
all the principles of order and regular government; a practice
which leads more directly to public convulsions, and the ruin
of popular governments, than any other which has yet been displayed
among us.
PUBLIUS
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