The Call for a Convention
Having witnessed, as a member of the Revolutionary
Congress, the inadequacies of the powers conferred by the "Articles
of Confederation," and having become, after
the expiration of my term of service there, a member of the
Legislature of Virginia, I felt it to be my duty to spare no
efforts to impress on that body the alarming condition of the
U. States proceeding from that cause, and the evils threatened
by delay, in applying a remedy. With this, propositions were
made vesting in Congress the necessary powers to regulate trade,
then suffering under the monopolizing power abroad, and State
collisions at home, and to draw from that source the convenient
revenue it was capable of yielding. The propositions, though
received with favorable attention, and at one moment agreed
to in a crippled form, were finally frustrated, or, rather,
abandoned. Such, however, were the impressions which the public
discussions had made, that an alternative proposition, which
had been kept in reserve, being seasonably brought forward by
a highly respected member [of the Virginia legislature], who,
having long served in the State [Virginia] councils without
participating in the Federal, had more the ear of the Legislature
on that account, was adopted with little opposition. The proposition
invited the other states to concur with Virginia in a convention
of deputies commissioned to devise and report a uniform system
of commercial regulations. Commissioners on the part of the
State were at the same time appointed, myself of the number.
The convention proposed took place at Annapolis, in August,
1786 (see Annapolis
Convention). Being, however, very partially attended,
and it appearing to the members that a rapid progress, aided
by the experiment on foot, had made in ripening the public mind
for a radical reform of the Federal polity, they determined
to waive the object for which they were appointed, and recommend
a convention, with enlarged powers, to be held the year following,
in the city of Philadelphia. The Legislature of Virginia happened
to be the first that acted on the recommendation, and being
a member [of the Virginia Legislature], the only one of the
attending commissioners at Annapolis who was so, my best exertions
were used in promoting a compliance with it, and in giving to
the example the most conciliating form, and all the weight that
could be derived from a list of deputies having the name of
Washington at its head.
Letter to Thomas J. Wharton,
August, 1827 (Madison
1865, III, pages 586-587)
Convictions
That most of us carried into the Convention a profound impression,
produced by the experienced inadequacy of the old Confederation,
and by the monitory examples of all similar ones, ancient and
modern, as to the necessity of binding the States together by
a strong Constitution, is certain.
Letter to John G. Jackson, December 27,
1821 (Madison
1865, III, page 244)
The Virginia Plan
The resolutions [i.e., the Virginia Plan] proposed by him [Virginia
Governor Randolph] were the result of a consultation among the
Deputies [the Virginia delegation], the whole number, seven,
being present. The part which Virginia had borne in bringing
about the Convention suggested the idea that some such initiative
step might be expected from their deputation, and Mr. Randolph
was designated for the task. It was perfectly understood that
the propositions committed no one to their precise tenor or
form, and that the members of the deputation would be as free
in discussing and shaping them as the other members of the Convention.
Mr. Randolph was made the organ on the occasion, being then
the Governor of the State, of distinguished talents, and in
the habit of public speaking. General Washington, though at
the head of the list, was . . . disinclined to take the lead.
It was also foreseen that he would be immediately called to
the presiding station.
Letter to John Tyler (not sent?), 1833 (Madison
1865, IV, page 281)
Federalism
It was generally agreed that the objects of the Union could
not be secured by any system founded on the principle of a confederation
of Sovereign States. A voluntary observance of the federal law
by all the members could never be hoped for. A compulsive one
could evidently never be reduced to practice, and if it could,
involved equal calamities to the innocent and guilty, the necessity
of a military force, both obnoxious and dangerous, and, in general,
a scene resembling much more a civil war than the administration
of a regular Government.
Hence was embraced the alternative of a Government which, instead
of operating on the States, should operate without their intervention
on the individuals composing them; and hence the change in the
principle and proportion of representation.
This ground-work being laid, the great objects which presented
themselves were: 1. To unite a proper energy in the Executive,
and a proper stability in the Legislative departments, with
the essential characters of Republican Government. 2. To draw
a line of demarkation which would give to the General Government
every power requisite for general purposes, and leave to the
States every power which might be most beneficially administered
by them. 3. To provide for the different interests of different
parts of the Union. 4. To adjust the clashing pretensions of
the large and small States. Each of these objects was pregnant
with difficulties. The whole of them together formed a task
more difficult than can be well conceived by those who were
not concerned in the execution of it. . . .
The Presidency
The first of these objects, as respects the Executive, was
peculiarly embarrassing. On the question whether it should consist
of a single person or a plurality of co-ordinate members, on
the mode of appointment, on the duration in office, on the degree
of power, on the re-eligibility, tedious and reiterated discussions
took place. The plurality of co-ordinate members had finally
but few advocates. Governor [of Virginia] Randolph was at the
head of them. The modes of appointment proposed were various:
as by the people at large, by electors chosen by the people,
by the Executives of the States, by the Congress; some preferring
a joint ballot of the two Houses; some, a separate concurrent
ballot, allowing to each a negative on the other house; some,
a nomination of several candidates by one House, out of whom
a choice should be made by the other. Several other modifications
were started. The expedient at length adopted seemed to give
pretty general satisfaction to the members. As to the duration
in office, a few would have preferred a tenure during good behaviour;
a considerable number would have done so in case an easy and
effectual removal by impeachment could be settled.
It was much agitated whether a long term, seven years for example,
with a subsequent and perpetual ineligibility, or a short term,
with a capacity to be re-elected, should be fixed. In favor
of the first opinion were urged the danger of a gradual degeneracy
of re-elections from time to time, into first a life and then
hereditary tenure, and the favorable effect of an incapacity
to be reappointed on the independent exercise of the Executive
authority. On the other side it was contended that the prospect
of necessary degradation would discourage the most dignified
characters from aspiring to the office; would take away the
principal motive to the faithful discharge of its duties--the
hope of being rewarded with a reappointment; would stimulate
ambition to violent efforts for holding over the Constitutional
term; and instead of producing an independent administration
and a firmer defense of the constitutional rights of the department,
would render the officer more indifferent to the importance
of a place which he would soon be obliged to quit forever, and
more ready to yield to the encroachments of the Legislature,
of which he might again be a member.
The questions concerning the degree of power turned chiefly
on the appointment to offices, and the controul on the Legislature.
An absolute appointment to all offices, to some offices, to
no offices, formed the scale of opinions on the first point.
On the second, some contended for an absolute negative, as the
only possible mean of reducing to practice the theory of a free
Government, which forbids a mixture of the Legislative and Executive
powers. Others would be content with a revisionary power, to
be overruled by three-fourths of both Houses. It was warmly
urged that the judiciary department should be associated in
the revision. The idea of some was, that a separate revision
should be given to the two departments; that if either objected,
two-thirds, if both, three-fourths, should be necessary to overrule.
Congress
In forming the Senate, the great anchor of the government,
the questions, as they come within the first object, turned
mostly on the mode of appointment, and the duration of it. The
different modes proposed were: 1. By the House of Representatives.
2. By the Executive. 3. By electors chosen by the people for
the purpose. 4. By the State Legislatures. On the point of duration,
the propositions descended from good behaviour to four years,
through the intermediate terms of nine, seven, six, and five
years. The election of the other branch was first determined
to be triennial, and afterwards reduced to biennial.
Enumerated Powers
The second object, the due partition of power between the General
and local Governments, was perhaps, of all, the most nice and
difficult. A few contended for an entire abolition of the States;
some, for indefinite power of Legislation in the Congress, with
a negative on the laws of the States; some, for such a power
without a negative; some, for a limited power of legislation,
with such a negative; the majority, finally, for a limited power
without the negative. The question with regard to the negative
underwent repeated discussions, and was finally rejected by
a bare majority. . . .
Letter to Thomas Jefferson, October 24,
1787 (Madison
1865, I, pages 343-357)
Regulation of Trade
[Madison discusses] the third object above mentioned, the adjustments
of the different interests of different parts of the continent.
Some contended for an unlimited power over trade, including
exports as well as imports, and over slave as well as other
imports; some, for such a power, provided the concurrence of
two-thirds of both Houses were required; some, for such a qualification
of the power, with an exemption of exports and slaves; others,
for an exemption of exports only. The result is seen in the
Constitution. South Carolina and Georgia were inflexible on
the point of the Slaves.
Letter to Thomas Jefferson, October 24,
1787 (Madison
1865, I, pages 343-357)
Big State — Small State
The knot felt as the Gordian one [fourth object in preceding
letter] was the question between the between the larger and
smaller States on the rule of voting in the Senatorial branch
of the legislature; the latter claiming, the former opposing,
the rule of equality. . . [A]n equal division of the votes on
the question had reiterated and prolonged till it had become
. . . seriously alarming. It was during this point of gloom
that Dr. Franklin made his proposition for a religious service
in the Convention . . . [A] proposition had been made . . .
to refer the knotty question to a committee with a view to some
compromise; the indications being manifest that sundry members
from the larger States were relaxing in their opposition, and
that some ground of compromise was contemplated, such as finally
took place . . .
Letter to Jared Sparkes, April 8, 1831 (Madison
1865, IV, pages 169-170)
The Final Document
The finish given to the style and arrangement of the Constitution
fairly belong to the pen of Mr. [Gouverneur] Morris; the task
having been probably handed over to him by the Chairman of the
Committee [on Style] . . . with the ready concurrence of the
others.
Letter to Jared Sparkes, April 8, 1831 (Madison
1865, IV, page 169)
Opposition
It will not escape you that three names only from Virginia
are subscribed to the act. Mr. Wythe did not return after the
death of his lady. Doctor McClurg left the Convention some time
before the adjournment. The Governor [Randolph] and Col. Mason
refused to be parties to it. Mr. Gerry was the only other member
who refused. The objections of the Governor turn principally
on the latitude of the general powers, and on the connection
established between the President and the Senate. He wished
that the plan should be proposed to the States, with liberty
to them to suggest alterations, which should all be referred
to another General Convention, to be incorporated into the plan
as far as might be judged expedient. He was not inveterate in
his opposition, and grounded his refusal to subscribe pretty
much on his unwillingness to commit himself, so as not to be
at liberty to be governed by further lights on the subject.
Col. Mason left Philadelphia in an exceeding ill humor indeed.
A number of little circumstances, arising in part from the impatience
which prevailed towards the close of the business, conspired
to whet his acrimony. He returned to Virginia with a fixed disposition
to prevent the adoption of the plan, if possible. He considers
the want of a Bill of Rights as a fatal objection. His other
objections are to the substitution of the Senate in place of
an Executive Council, and to the powers vested in that body;
to the powers of the Judiciary; to the vice president being
made president of the Senate; to the smallness of the number
of Representatives; to the restriction on the States with regard
to ex post facto laws; and most of all, probably, to the power
of regulating trade by a majority only of each House. He has
some other lesser objections. Being now under the necessity
of justifying his refusal to sign, he will, of course, muster
every possible one. His conduct has given great umbrage to the
County of Fairfax, and particularly to the Town of Alexandria.
He is already instructed to promote in the Assembly the calling
a Convention, and will probably be either not deputed to the
Convention, or be tied up by express instructions. He did not
object in general to the powers vested in the National Government
so much as the modification. In some respects he admitted that
some further powers would have improved the system. He acknowledged,
in particular, that a negative on the State laws and the appointment
of the State Executives ought to be ingredients; but supposed
that the public mind would not now bear them, and that experience
would hereafter produce these amendments.
Letter to Thomas Jefferson, October 24,
1787 (Madison
1865, I, pages 343-357)
This text has been excerpted from the
letters of James Madison to tell the story of the Constitutional
Convention in his words. These quotes and more are in the Life
of James Madison and the James
Madison Quotations. About half the material is from
a single letter to Thomas
Jefferson.
