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Quotes on the
Constitution
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[T]he Constitution of the United States was
created by the people of the United States composing the respective
states, who alone had the right…
Outline, September, 1829 (Madison,
1865, IV, page 19)
The merit of the founders of our Republics lies in the more
accurate views and the practical applications of the doctrines
[of self-government]. The rights of man as the foundation
of just Government had been long understood; but the superstructures
projected had been sadly defective.
Letter to N. P. Trist, February—,
1830 (Madison,
1865, IV, page 58)
[The Constitution of the United States] was not, like the
fable Goddess of Wisdom, the offspring of a single brain.
It ought to be regarded as the work of many heads and many
hands.
Letter to Revd William Cogswell,
March 10, 1834 (Madison,
1865, IV, pages 341-342)
The inconsistency is monstrous between the professed veneration
for his [Thomas Jefferson's] name and the anxiety to make
him avow opinions in the most pointed opposition to those
maintained by him in his more deliberate correspondence with
others, and acted on through his whole official life.
Letter to W. C. Rives, January 23,
1829 (Madison,
1865, IV, page 7)
[H]is authority is made to weigh nothing, or outweigh everything,
according to the scale in which it is put.
Letter to Joseph C. Cabell, March
19, 1829 (Madison,
1865, IV, page 34)
Allowance…ought to be made for a habit in Mr. Jefferson,
as in others of great genius, of expressing in strong and
round terms impressions of the moment.
Letter to N. P. Trist, May ___, 1832
(Madison,
1865, IV, page 218)
In the Virginia resolutions and reports the plural number,
States, is in every instance used…As I am now known
to have drawn these documents, I may say…that the distinction
was intentional…The Kentucky resolutions, being less
guarded, have been more easily perverted.
Letter to N. P. Trist, December 23,
1832 (Madison,
1865, IV, page 228)
That the leading agency of such a man [Alexander Hamilton],
and from a State in the position of New York, should, in a
project for severing the Union, be anxiously wished for by
its authors, is not to be doubted; and an experimental invitation
of him to attend a select meeting may, without difficulty,
be supposed. But obvious considerations oppose a belief that
such an invitation would be accepted; and, if accepted, the
supposition would remain, that his intention might be to dissuade
his party and personal friends from a conspiracy as rash,
as wicked, and as ruinous to the party itself as to the country.
Letter to J. Q. Adams, Feby 24,
1829, (Madison,
1865, IV, pages 31-32)
The meaning collected from the general scope, and from a
collation of the several parts [of the Virginia Resolutions]
ought not to be affected by a particular word or phrase not
irreconcilable with all the rest, and not made more precise,
because no danger of their being misunderstood was thought
of.
Letter to N. P. Trist, February 1830
(Madison,
1865, IV, page 58)
It may often happen, as experience proves, that erroneous
constructions, not anticipated, may not be sufficiently guarded
against in the language used…
Letter to Edward Everett, August,
1830 (Madison,
1865, IV, page 104
[E]rrors which have their sources in an oblivion of explanatory
circumstances, and in the silent innovations of time on the
meaning of words and phrases.
Letter to Edward Everett, Apl 8,
1830 (Madison,
1865, IV, page 70)
Although I have not concealed my opinion of that doctrine
[Nullification], and of the use made of the proceedings of
Virginia [Virginia Resolutions], in 1798-99, I have been unwilling
to make a public exhibition of them, as well from a consideration
that it might appear obtrusive, as that it might enlist me
as a newspaper polemic, and lay me under an obligation to
correct errors in other cases in which I was concerned, or
by my silence admit that they were not errors.
Letter to Daniel Webster, May 27,
1830 (Madison,
1865, IV, pages 84-85)
A silent appeal to a cool and candid judgment of the public
may, perhaps, serve the cause of truth.
Letter to Joseph C. Cabell, March
19, 1829 (Madison,
1865, IV, page 35)
I think myself that it will be expedient…to lay the
foundation of the new system in such a ratification by the
people themselves of the several States as will render it
clearly paramount to their Legislative authorities.
Letter to Thomas Jefferson, March
19, 1787 (Madison,
1865, I, page 285)
To give the new system its proper validity and energy, a
ratification must be obtained from the people, and not merely
from the ordinary authority of the Legislatures.
Letter to George Washington, April
16, 1787 (Madison,
1865, I, page 290)
[W]e may define a republic to be…a government which
derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great
body of the people, and is administered by persons holding
their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during
good behavior…
Federalist
No. 39
[A] pure democracy…[is] a society consisting of a small
number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government
in person…
Federalist
No. 10
The two great points of difference between a democracy and
a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in
the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest;
secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere
of country, over which the latter may be extended.
Federalist
No. 10
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,
and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
Federalist
No. 47
[U]nless these departments be so far connected and
blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the
others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires,
as essential to a free government, can never in practice be
duly maintained.
Federalist
No. 48
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest
of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights
of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that
such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of
government. But what is government itself, but the greatest
of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on government would
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered
by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must
first enable the government to control the governed; and in
the next place oblige it to control itself.
Federalist
No. 51
As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought,
in all governments, and actually will, in all free governments,
ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers; so there
are particular moments in public affairs when the people,
stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage,
or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men,
may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards
be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical
moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate
and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided
career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against
themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their
authority over the public mind?
Federalist
No. 63
The powers delegated by this constitution,
are appropriated to the departments to which they are respectively
distributed: so that the legislative department shall never
exercise the powers vested in the executive or judicial; nor
the executive exercise the powers vested in the legislative
or judicial; nor the judicial exercise the powers vested in
the legislative or executive departments.
Proposing
Bill of Rights to House, June 8, 1789
Encroachments of the States on the general authority, sacrifices
of national to local interests, interferences of the measures
of different States, form a great part of the history of our
political system.
Letter to Thomas Jefferson, October
24, 1787 (Madison,
1865, I, page 348)
[T]he powers of the federal government are enumerated; it
can only operate in certain cases; it has legislative powers
on defined and limited objects, beyond which it cannot extend
its jurisdiction.
Speech in the Virginia Ratifying
Convention, June 6, 1788, Elliot's Debates (in the American
Memory Collection of the Library of Congress)
[T]he Constitution and laws of the United
States are declared to be paramount to those of the individual
states, and an appellate supremacy is vested in the judicial
power of the United States…
Letter to M. L. Hulbert, May, 1830
(Madison,
1865, IV, pages 75-76)
The proposed Constitution…is…neither a national
nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In
its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources
from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn,
it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation
of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent
of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally,
in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is
neither wholly federal nor wholly national.
Federalist
No. 39
The compound Government of the United States is without a
model, and to be explained by itself, not by similitudes or
analogies. The terms Union, Federal, National, ought not to
be applied to it without the qualifications peculiar to the
system.
Outline, September, 1829 (Madison,
1865, IV, page 18)
In order to understand the true nature of the Constitution
of the United States, the error must be avoided…of viewing
it through the medium, of a Consolidated [unitary] Government,
or of a Confederated Government, whilst it is neither the
one nor the other; but a mixture of both.
North American Review, October, 1830
(Peterson,
1974, 2, pages 398-399)
No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason,
than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized;
wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular
power necessary for doing it is included.
Federalist
No. 44
In the Constitution, the great ends of government were particularly
enumerated; but all the means were not, nor could they all
be, pointed out, without making the Constitution a complete
code of laws: some discretionary power, and reasonable latitude,
must be left to the judgment of the legislature.
Debate
on the National Bank in the House of Representatives,
February 2, 1791.
I find, from looking into the amendments proposed by the
state conventions, that several are particularly anxious that
it should be declared in the constitution, that the powers
not therein delegated, should be reserved to the several states.
Perhaps words which may define this more precisely, than the
whole of the instrument now does, may be considered as superfluous.
I admit they may be deemed unnecessary; but there can be no
harm in making such a declaration, if gentlemen will allow
that the fact is as stated. I am sure I understand it so,
and do therefore propose it.
Proposing
Bill of Rights to House, June 8, 1789
If Congress can do whatever in their discretion can be done
by money, and will promote the General Welfare, the Government
is no longer a limited one, possessing enumerated powers,
but an indefinite one, subject to particular exceptions.
Letter to Edmund Pendleton, January
21, 1792 (Madison,
1865, I, page 546)
If…the powers of the General Government be carried
to unconstitutional lengths, it will be the result of a majority
of the States and of the people, actuated by some impetuous
feeling, or some real or supposed interest, overruling the
minority, and not of successful attempts by the General Government
to overpower both.
Letter to John G. Jackson, Dec. 27,
1821 (Madison,
1865, III, pages 243-247)
Whether the Constitution, as it has divided the powers of
Government between the States in their separate and in their
united capacities, tends to an oppressive aggrandizement of
the General Government, or to an anarchical independence of
the State Governments, is a problem which time alone can absolutely
determine.
Letter to John G. Jackson, December
27, 1821 (Madison,
1865, III, pages 243-247
[I]t [is] indispensable that some provision should be made
for defending the Community agst [against] the incapacity,
negligence, or perfidy of the chief Magistrate. The limitation
of the period of his service was not a sufficient security.
He might lose his capacity after his appointment. He might
pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation or
oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign powers…In
the case of the Executive Magistracy, which was to be administered
by a single man, loss of capacity or corruption, was more
within the compass of probable events, and either of them
might be fatal to the Republic.
Constitutional Convention, July 20,
1787 (Madison,
1900-1910, IV, pages 15-16)
Mr. MADISON objected to a trial of the President by the Senate,
especially as he was to be impeached by the other branch of
the Legislature; and for any act which might be called a misdemeanor.
The President under these circumstances was made improperly
dependent. He would prefer the Supreme Court for the trial
of impeachments, or rather a tribunal of which that should
form a part.
Constitutional Convention, September
8, 1787 (Madison,
1900-1910, IV, pages 408-409)
If it be a fundamental principle of free Govt [government],
that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers should
be separately exercised, it is equally so that they be independently
exercised. There is the same & perhaps greater, reason
why the Executive shd [should] be independent of the Legislature,
than why the Judiciary should. A coalition of the two former
powers would be more immediately & certainly dangerous
to public liberty. It is essential then that the appointment
of the Executive should either be drawn from some source,
or held by some tenure that will give him a free agency with
regard to the Legislature. This could not be if he was to
be appointable from time to time by the legislature. It was
not clear that an appointment in the Ist instance even with
an ineligibility afterwards would not establish an improper
connection between the two departments. Certain it was that
the appointment would be attended with intrigues and contentions
that ought not to be unnecessarily admitted. He was disposed
for these reasons to refer the appointment to some other source.
The people at large was in his opinion the fittest in itself.
It would be as likely as any that could be devised to produce
an Executive Magistrate of distinguished Character. The people
generally could only know & vote for some Citizen whose
merits had rendered him an object of general attention &
esteem. There was one difficulty however of a serious nature
attending an immediate choice by the people. The right of
suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern than the
Southern States; and the latter could have no influence in
the election, on the score of the Negroes. The substitution
of electors obviated this difficulty and seemed on the whole
to be liable to fewest objections.
Constitutional Convention, July 20,
1787 (Madison,
1900-1910, IV, pages 7-8)
I will sketch for your consideration a substitute which has
occurred to myself for the faulty part of the Constitution
in question:
"The electors to be chosen in districts,
not more than two in any one district…Each elector to
give two votes, one naming his first choice, the other his
next choice. If there be a majority of all the votes on the
first list for the same person, he of course to be President;
if not, and there be a majority…on the other list for
the same person, he then to be the final choice; if there
be no such majority on either list, then a choice to be made
by joint ballot of the two Houses of Congress from the two
names having the greatest number of votes on the two ballots
taken together."
…The same process might be observed in electing the
Vice President.
Letter to George Hay, August 23,
1823 (Madison,
III, page 335.)
Interpreting the Constitution
I acknowledge, in the ordinary course of
government, that the exposition of the laws and Constitution
devolves upon the judicial; but I beg to know upon what principle
it can he contended that any one department draws from the Constitution
greater powers than another, in marking out the limits of the
powers of the several departments. The Constitution is the charter
of the people in the government; it specifies certain great
powers as absolutely granted, and marks out the departments
to exercise them. If the constitutional boundary of either be
brought into question, I do not see that any one of these independent
departments has more right than another to declare their sentiments
on that point.
Speech before House of Representatives,
Elliot's Debates, June 16, 1789 (in the American
Memory Collection of the Library of Congress)
As a guide in expounding and applying the provisions of the
Constitution, the debates and incidental decisions of the
Convention can have no authoritative character…[T]he
legitimate meanings of the Instrument must be derived from
the text itself; or if a key is to be sought elsewhere, it
must be…in the sense attached to it by the people in
their respective State Conventions, where it received all
the authority which it possesses.
Letter to Thomas Ritchie, September
15, 1821 (Madison,
1865, III, page 228)
Another error has been in ascribing to the intention of the
Convention which formed the Constitution an undue ascendancy
in expounding it. Apart from the difficulty of verifying that
intention, it is clear, that if the meaning of the Constitution
is to be sought out of itself, it is not in the proceedings
of the body that proposed it, but in those of the State Conventions,
which gave it all the validity and authority which it possesses.
Letter to N.P. Trist, December, 1831
(Madison,
1865, IV, page 211)
I have always supposed that the meaning of a law, and, for
a like reason, of a constitution, so far as it depends on
judicial interpretation, was to result from a course of particular
decisions, and not those from a previous and abstract comment
on the subject.
Letter to Judge Roan, September
2, 1819 (Madison,
1865, III, page 143)
The "Federalist" may fairly enough
be regarded as the most authentic exposition of the text of
the federal Constitution as understood by the Body [Constitutional
Convention] which prepared & and the Authorities [state
ratifying conventions] which accepted it.
Letter to Thomas Jefferson, February
8, 1825 (Peterson,
1974, 2. page 383)
A construction of the Constitution practised upon or acknowledged
for a period of nearly forty years, has received a national
sanction not to be reversed but by an evidence at least equivalent
to the national will. If every new Congress were to disregard
a meaning of the instrument uniformly sustained by their predecessors
for such a period, there would be less stability in that fundamental
law than is is required for the public good in the ordinary
expositions of the law. And the case of the Chancellor's foot,
as a substitute for an established measure, would illustrate
the greater as well as the lesser evil of uncertainty and
mutability.
Letter to Joseph C. Cabell, March
18, 1827 (Madison,
1865, III, page 573)
Can it be of less consequence that the meaning of a Constitution
should be fixed and known, than a meaning of a law should
be so?
Letter to Mr. Ingersoll, June 25,
1831 (Madison,
1865, IV, page 185)
With respect to the words, "general welfare," I
have always regarded them as qualified by the details of power
connected with them. To take them in a literal and unlimited
sense would be a metamorphosis of the Constitution…[that]
was not contemplated by the creators.
Letter to James Robertson, April
20, 1831 (Madison,
1865, IV, pages 171-172)
[T]he real measure of the powers meant to be granted to Congress
by the Constitution is to be sought in the specifications,
to be expounded, indeed, not with the strictness applied to
an ordinary statute by a court of law, nor, on the other hand,
with a latitude that, under the name of means for carrying
into execution a limited Government, would transform it into
a Government without limits.
Letter to M. L. Hulbert, May, 1830
(Madison,
1865, IV, page 74)
I still must think…that the text of the Consitution
is best interpreted by reference to the tripartite theory
of government to which practice has been conformed and which
so long and uniform a practice would seem to have established.
Letter to Charles Francis Adams,
October 13, 1825 (Madison,
1865, IV, page 385)
27th Amendment
There are several lesser cases enumerated in my proposition,
in which I wish also to see some alteration take place. That
article which leaves it in the power of the legislature to
ascertain its own emolument is one to which I allude…[T]here
is a seeming impropriety in leaving any set of men without
control to put their hand into the public coffers, to take
out money to put in their pockets; there is a seeming indecorum
in such power, which leads me to propose a change…I
have gone therefore so far as to fix it, that no law, varying
the compensation, shall operate until there is a change in
the legislature; in which case it cannot be for the particular
benefit of those who are concerned in determining the value
of the service.
Proposing
Bill of Rights to House, June 8, 1789
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