The Executive Department
Further Considered
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, March 18, 1788.
To the People of the State of New York:
THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates,
that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of
republican government. The enlightened well-wishers to this
species of government must at least hope that the supposition
is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth,
without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their
own principles. Energy in the Executive is a leading character
in the definition of good government. It is essential to the
protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not
less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to
the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed
combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of
justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises
and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every
man the least conversant in Roman story, knows how often that
republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of
a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator, as well
against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to
the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community
whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as
against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest
and destruction of Rome.
There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments
or examples on this head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble
execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another
phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever
it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.
Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men
of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive,
it will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which
constitute this energy? How far can they be combined with those
other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican
sense? And how far does this combination characterize the plan
which has been reported by the convention?
The ingredients which constitute energy in the
Executive are, first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an
adequate provision for its support; fourthly, competent powers.
The ingredients which constitute safety in the
republican sense are, first, a due dependence on the people,
secondly, a due responsibility.
Those politicians and statesmen who have been
the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and
for the justice of their views, have declared in favor of a
single Executive and a numerous legislature. They have with
great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualification
of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to
power in a single hand, while they have, with equal propriety,
considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom,
and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people
and to secure their privileges and interests.
That unity is conducive to energy will not be
disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally
characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent
degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion
as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.
This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either
by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity
and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject,
in whole or in part, to the control and cooperation of others,
in the capacity of counsellors to him. Of the first, the two
Consuls of Rome may serve as an example; of the last, we shall
find examples in the constitutions of several of the States.
New York and New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only
States which have intrusted the executive authority wholly to
single men (1).
Both these methods of destroying the unity of the Executive
have their partisans; but the votaries of an executive council
are the most numerous. They are both liable, if not to equal,
to similar objections, and may in most lights be examined in
conjunction.
The experience of other nations will afford little
instruction on this head. As far, however, as it teaches any
thing, it teaches us not to be enamoured of plurality in the
Executive. We have seen that the Achaeans, on an experiment
of two Praetors, were induced to abolish one. The Roman history
records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the
dissensions between the Consuls, and between the military Tribunes,
who were at times substituted for the Consuls. But it gives
us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to the state
from the circumstance of the plurality of those magistrates.
That the dissensions between them were not more frequent or
more fatal, is a matter of astonishment, until we advert to
the singular position in which the republic was almost continually
placed, and to the prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances
of the state, and pursued by the Consuls, of making a division
of the government between them. The patricians engaged in a
perpetual struggle with the plebeians for the preservation of
their ancient authorities and dignities; the Consuls, who were
generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united
by the personal interest they had in the defense of the privileges
of their order. In addition to this motive of union, after the
arms of the republic had considerably expanded the bounds of
its empire, it became an established custom with the Consuls
to divide the administration between themselves by lot one of
them remaining at Rome to govern the city and its environs,
the other taking the command in the more distant provinces.
This expedient must, no doubt, have had great influence in preventing
those collisions and rivalships which might otherwise have embroiled
the peace of the republic.
But quitting the dim light of historical research,
attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and good
se se, we shall discover much greater cause to reject than to
approve the idea of plurality in the Executive, under any modification
whatever.
Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any
common enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference
of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they
are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar
danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either,
and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions
are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability,
weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operation of
those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately assail
the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of
a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most
important measures of the government, in the most critical emergencies
of the state. And what is still worse, they might split the
community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions,
adhering differently to the different individuals who composed
the magistracy.
Men often oppose a thing, merely because they
have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been
planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted,
and have happened to disapprove, opposition then becomes, in
their estimation, an indispensable duty of self-love. They seem
to think themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives of
personal infallibility, to defeat the success of what has been
resolved upon contrary to their sentiments. Men of upright,
benevolent tempers have too many opportunities of remarking,
with horror, to what desperate lengths this disposition is sometimes
carried, and how often the great interests of society are sacrificed
to the vanity, to the conceit, and to the obstinacy of individuals,
who have credit enough to make their passions and their caprices
interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now before the
public may, in its consequences, afford melancholy proofs of
the effects of this despicable frailty, or rather detestable
vice, in the human character.
Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences
from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted
to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary,
and therefore unwise, to introduce them into the constitution
of the Executive. It is here too that they may be most pernicious.
In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil
than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings
of parties in that department of the government, though they
may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation
and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority.
When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be
at an end. That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable.
But no favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages
of dissension in the executive department. Here, they are pure
and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate.
They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan
or measure to which they relate, from the first step to the
final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities
in the Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in
its composition, vigor and expedition, and this without any
counterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy
of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security, every
thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality.
It must be confessed that these observations apply
with principal weight to the first case supposed that is, to
a plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority a
scheme, the advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous
sect; but they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable
weight to the project of a council, whose concurrence is made
constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible
Executive. An artful cabal in that council would be able to
distract and to enervate the whole system of administration.
If no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views and
opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise
of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness
and dilatoriness.
But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality
in the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as
the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy
responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds to censure and
to punishment. The first is the more important of the two, especially
in an elective office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener
act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any
longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious
to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive
adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often
becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine
on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure,
or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is
shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under
such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left
in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may
have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes
so complicated that, where there are a number of actors who
may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we
may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement,
yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the
evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.
"I was overruled by my council. The council
were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible to
obtain any better resolution on the point.'' These and similar
pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. And
who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the
odium, of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction?
Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake
the unpromising task, if there happen to be collusion between
the parties concerned, how easy it is to clothe the circumstances
with so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was the
precise conduct of any of those parties?
In the single instance in which the governor of
this State is coupled with a council that is, in the appointment
to offices, we have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now
under consideration. Scandalous appointments to important offices
have been made. Some cases, indeed, have been so flagrant that
ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. When
inquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the governor
on the members of the council, who, on their part, have charged
it upon his nomination; while the people remain altogether at
a loss to determine, by whose influence their interests have
been committed to hands so unqualified and so manifestly improper.
In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars.
It is evident from these considerations, that
the plurality of the Executive tends to deprive the people of
the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise
of any delegated power, first, the restraints of public opinion,
which lose their efficacy, as well on account of the division
of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as
on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and,
secondly, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness
the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to
their removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases
which admit of it.
In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate;
and it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the public
peace, that he is unaccountable for his administration, and
his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that
kingdom, than to annex to the king a constitutional council,
who may be responsible to the nation for the advice they give.
Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the
executive department an idea inadmissible in a free government.
But even there the king is not bound by the resolutions of his
council, though they are answerable for the advice they give.
He is the absolute master of his own conduct in the exercise
of his office, and may observe or disregard the counsel given
to him at his sole discretion.
But in a republic, where every magistrate ought
to be personally responsible for his behavior in office the
reason which in the British Constitution dictates the propriety
of a council, not only ceases to apply, but turns against the
institution. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes
a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the chief
magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the
national justice for his good behavior. In the American republic,
it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended
and necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself.
The idea of a council to the Executive, which
has so generally obtained in the State constitutions, has been
derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which considers
power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single
man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the
case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would
not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite
side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive
power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with
a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be "deep,
solid, and ingenious,'' that "the executive power is more
easily confined when it is ONE'' (2);
that it is far more safe there should be a single
object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and,
in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive is rather
dangerous than friendly to liberty.
A little consideration will satisfy us, that the
species of security sought for in the multiplication of the
Executive, is unattainable. Numbers must be so great as to render
combination difficult, or they are rather a source of danger
than of security. The united credit and influence of several
individuals must be more formidable to liberty, than the credit
and influence of either of them separately. When power, therefore,
is placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to admit
of their interests and views being easily combined in a common
enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse,
and more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the
hands of one man; who, from the very circumstance of his being
alone, will be more narrowly watched and more readily suspected,
and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as when he
is associated with others. The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name
denotes their number (3),
were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any
ONE of them would have been. No person would think of proposing
an Executive much more numerous than that body; from six to
a dozen have been suggested for the number of the council. The
extreme of these numbers, is not too great for an easy combination;
and from such a combination America would have more to fear,
than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to
a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are
generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions,
are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad and are
almost always a cloak to his faults.
I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense;
though it be evident that if the council should be numerous
enough to answer the principal end aimed at by the institution,
the salaries of the members, who must be drawn from their homes
to reside at the seat of government, would form an item in the
catalogue of public expenditures too serious to be incurred
for an object of equivocal utility. I will only add that, prior
to the appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met with an
intelligent man from any of the States, who did not admit, as
the result of experience, that the UNITY of the executive of
this State was one of the best of the distinguishing features
of our constitution.
PUBLIUS
(1) New York has no council
except for the single purpose of appointing to offices; New
Jersey has a council whom the governor may consult. But I think,
from the terms of the constitution, their resolutions do not
bind him. Return to text
(2) De Lolme. Return
to text
(3) Ten. Return to text
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