The Senate
For the Independent Journal.
To the People of the State of New York:
HAVING examined the constitution of the House
of Representatives, and answered such of the objections against
it as seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination
of the Senate.
The heads into which this member of the government
may be considered are: I. The qualification of senators; II.
The appointment of them by the State legislatures; III. The
equality of representation in the Senate; IV. The number of
senators, and the term for which they are to be elected; V.
The powers vested in the Senate.
I. The qualifications proposed for senators,
as distinguished from those of representatives, consist in a
more advanced age and a longer period of citizenship. A senator
must be thirty years of age at least (see Constitution
1.3.3); as a representative
must be twenty-five (see Constitution
1.2.2).
And the former must have been a citizen nine years (see Constitution
1.3.3);
as seven years are required for the latter (see Constitution
1.2.2).
The propriety of these distinctions is explained by the nature
of the senatorial trust, which, requiring greater extent of
information and stability of character, requires at the same
time that the senator should have reached a period of life most
likely to supply these advantages; and which, participating
immediately in transactions with foreign nations, ought to be
exercised by none who are not thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions
and habits incident to foreign birth and education. The term
of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total
exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and talents may
claim a share in the public confidence, and an indiscriminate
and hasty admission of them, which might create a channel for
foreign influence on the national councils.
II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate
on the appointment of senators by the State legislatures (see
Constitution
1.3).
Among the various modes which might have been devised for constituting
this branch of the government, that which has been proposed
by the convention is probably the most congenial with the public
opinion. It is recommended by the double advantage of favoring
a select appointment, and of giving to the State governments
such an agency in the formation of the federal government as
must secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient
link between the two systems.
III. The equality of representation in the Senate
(see Constitution
1.3) is another point,
which, being evidently the result of compromise between the
opposite pretensions of the large and the small States, does
not call for much discussion. If indeed it be right, that among
a people thoroughly incorporated into one nation, every district
ought to have a PROPORTIONAL share in the government, and that
among independent and sovereign States, bound together by a
simple league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to
have an EQUAL share in the common councils, it does not appear
to be without some reason that in a compound republic, partaking
both of the national and federal character, the government ought
to be founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional
and equal representation. But it is superfluous to try, by the
standard of theory, a part of the Constitution which is allowed
on all hands to be the result, not of theory, but ``of a spirit
of amity, and that mutual deference and concession which the
peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable.''
A common government, with powers equal to its objects, is called
for by the voice, and still more loudly by the political situation,
of America. A government founded on principles more consonant
to the wishes of the larger States, is not likely to be obtained
from the smaller States. The only option, then, for the former,
lies between the proposed government and a government still
more objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of prudence
must be to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging
a fruitless anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may
ensue, to contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which
may qualify the sacrifice.
In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal
vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recognition
of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States,
and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty.
So far the equality ought to be no less acceptable to the large
than to the small States; since they are not less solicitous
to guard, by every possible expedient, against an improper consolidation
of the States into one simple republic.
Another advantage accruing from this ingredient
in the constitution of the Senate is, the additional impediment
it must prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or
resolution [JMU editor: for the raising of revenue] can now
be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the
people, and then, of a majority of the States (see
Constitution
1.7.1). It must be acknowledged
that this complicated check on legislation may in some instances
be injurious as well as beneficial; and that the peculiar defense
which it involves in favor of the smaller States, would be more
rational, if any interests common to them, and distinct from
those of the other States, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar
danger. But as the larger States will always be able, by their
power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of
this prerogative of the lesser States, and as the facility and
excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments
are most liable, it is not impossible that this part of the
Constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears
to many in contemplation.
IV. The number of senators, and the duration of
their appointment (see Constitution
1.3), come next to be
considered. In order to form an accurate judgment on both of
these points, it will be proper to inquire into the purposes
which are to be answered by a senate; and in order to ascertain
these, it will be necessary to review the inconveniences which
a republic must suffer from the want of such an institution.
First. It is a misfortune incident to republican
government, though in a less degree than to other governments,
that those who administer it may forget their obligations to
their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important
trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of
the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power
with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the
government. It doubles the security to the people, by requiring
the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation
or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise
be sufficient. This is a precaution founded on such clear principles,
and now so well understood in the United States, that it would
be more than superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark,
that as the improbability of sinister combinations will be in
proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies,
it must be politic to distinguish them from each other by every
circumstance which will consist with a due harmony in all proper
measures, and with the genuine principles of republican government.
Secondly. The necessity of a senate is not less
indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies
to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and
to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious
resolutions. Examples on this subject might be cited without
number; and from proceedings within the United States, as well
as from the history of other nations. But a position that will
not be contradicted, need not be proved. All that need be remarked
is, that a body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself
to be free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous.
It ought, moreover, to possess great firmness, and consequently
ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration.
Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a senate
lies in a want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles
of legislation. It is not possible that an assembly of men called
for the most part from pursuits of a private nature, continued
in appointment for a short time, and led by no permanent motive
to devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the
laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their
country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety
of important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust.
It may be affirmed, on the best grounds, that no small share
of the present embarrassments of America is to be charged on
the blunders of our governments; and that these have proceeded
from the heads rather than the hearts of most of the authors
of them. What indeed are all the repealing, explaining, and
amending laws, which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes,
but so many monuments of deficient wisdom; so many impeachments
exhibited by each succeeding against each preceding session;
so many admonitions to the people, of the value of those aids
which may be expected from a well-constituted senate?
A good government implies two things: first, fidelity
to the object of government, which is the happiness of the people;
secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can
be best attained. Some governments are deficient in both these
qualities; most governments are deficient in the first. I scruple
not to assert, that in American governments too little attention
has been paid to the last. The federal Constitution avoids this
error; and what merits particular notice, it provides for the
last in a mode which increases the security for the first.
Fourthly. The mutability in the public councils
arising from a rapid succession of new members, however qualified
they may be, points out, in the strongest manner, the necessity
of some stable institution in the government. Every new election
in the States is found to change one half of the representatives.
From this change of men must proceed a change of opinions; and
from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a continual
change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule
of prudence and every prospect of success. The remark is verified
in private life, and becomes more just, as well as more important,
in national transactions.
To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable
government would fill a volume. I will hint a few only, each
of which will be perceived to be a source of innumerable others.
In the first place, it forfeits the respect and
confidence of other nations, and all the advantages connected
with national character. An individual who is observed to be
inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to carry on his affairs
without any plan at all, is marked at once, by all prudent people,
as a speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and folly. His more
friendly neighbors may pity him, but all will decline to connect
their fortunes with his; and not a few will seize the opportunity
of making their fortunes out of his. One nation is to another
what one individual is to another; with this melancholy distinction
perhaps, that the former, with fewer of the benevolent emotions
than the latter, are under fewer restraints also from taking
undue advantage from the indiscretions of each other. Every
nation, consequently, whose affairs betray a want of wisdom
and stability, may calculate on every loss which can be sustained
from the more systematic policy of their wiser neighbors. But
the best instruction on this subject is unhappily conveyed to
America by the example of her own situation. She finds that
she is held in no respect by her friends; that she is the derision
of her enemies; and that she is a prey to every nation which
has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and
embarrassed affairs.
The internal effects of a mutable policy are still
more calamitous. It poisons the blessing of liberty itself.
It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are
made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous
that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot
be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are
promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man,
who knows what the law is to-day, can guess what it will be
to-morrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can
that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?
Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable
advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the
moneyed few over the industrious and uniformed mass of the people.
Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any
way affecting the value of the different species of property,
presents a new harvest to those who watch the change, and can
trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not by themselves,
but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow-citizens.
This is a state of things in which it may be said with some
truth that laws are made for the FEW, not for the MANY.
In another point of view, great injury results
from an unstable government. The want of confidence in the public
councils damps every useful undertaking, the success and profit
of which may depend on a continuance of existing arrangements.
What prudent merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch
of commerce when he knows not but that his plans may be rendered
unlawful before they can be executed? What farmer or manufacturer
will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular
cultivation or establishment, when he can have no assurance
that his preparatory labors and advances will not render him
a victim to an inconstant government? In a word, no great improvement
or laudable enterprise can go forward which requires the auspices
of a steady system of national policy.
But the most deplorable effect of all is that
diminution of attachment and reverence which steals into the
hearts of the people, towards a political system which betrays
so many marks of infirmity, and disappoints so many of their
flattering hopes. No government, any more than an individual,
will long be respected without being truly respectable; nor
be truly respectable, without possessing a certain portion of
order and stability.
PUBLIUS
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