The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number
of the House of Representatives)
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 19, 1788.
To the People of the State of New York:
THE SECOND charge against the House of Representatives is,
that it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the
interests of its constituents.
As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the
proposed number of representatives with the great extent of
the United States, the number of their inhabitants, and the
diversity of their interests, without taking into view at the
same time the circumstances which will distinguish the Congress
from other legislative bodies, the best answer that can be given
to it will be a brief explanation of these peculiarities.
It is a sound and important principle that the representative
ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances
of his constituents. But this principle can extend no further
than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority
and care of the representative relate. An ignorance of a variety
of minute and particular objects, which do not lie within the
compass of legislation, is consistent with every attribute necessary
to a due performance of the legislative trust. In determining
the extent of information required in the exercise of a particular
authority, recourse then must be had to the objects within the
purview of that authority.
What are to be the objects of federal legislation? Those which
are of most importance, and which seem most to require local
knowledge, are commerce, taxation, and the militia.
A proper regulation of commerce requires much information,
as has been elsewhere remarked; but as far as this information
relates to the laws and local situation of each individual State,
a very few representatives would be very sufficient vehicles
of it to the federal councils.
Taxation will consist, in a great measure, of duties which
will be involved in the regulation of commerce. So far the preceding
remark is applicable to this object. As far as it may consist
of internal collections, a more diffusive knowledge of the circumstances
of the State may be necessary. But will not this also be possessed
in sufficient degree by a very few intelligent men, diffusively
elected within the State? Divide the largest State into ten
or twelve districts, and it will be found that there will be
no peculiar local interests in either, which will not be within
the knowledge of the representative of the district. Besides
this source of information, the laws of the State, framed by
representatives from every part of it, will be almost of themselves
a sufficient guide. In every State there have been made, and
must continue to be made, regulations on this subject which
will, in many cases, leave little more to be done by the federal
legislature, than to review the different laws, and reduce them
in one general act. A skillful individual in his closet with
all the local codes before him, might compile a law on some
subjects of taxation for the whole union, without any aid from
oral information, and it may be expected that whenever internal
taxes may be necessary, and particularly in cases requiring
uniformity throughout the States, the more simple objects will
be preferred. To be fully sensible of the facility which will
be given to this branch of federal legislation by the assistance
of the State codes, we need only suppose for a moment that this
or any other State were divided into a number of parts, each
having and exercising within itself a power of local legislation.
Is it not evident that a degree of local information and preparatory
labor would be found in the several volumes of their proceedings,
which would very much shorten the labors of the general legislature,
and render a much smaller number of members sufficient for it?
The federal councils will derive great advantage from another
circumstance. The representatives of each State will not only
bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws, and a
local knowledge of their respective districts, but will probably
in all cases have been members, and may even at the very time
be members, of the State legislature, where all the local information
and interests of the State are assembled, and from whence they
may easily be conveyed by a very few hands into the legislature
of the United States.
The observations made on the subject of taxation apply with
greater force to the case of the militia. For however different
the rules of discipline may be in different States, they are
the same throughout each particular State; and depend on circumstances
which can differ but little in different parts of the same State.
The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning here used,
to prove the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives,
does not in any respect contradict what was urged on another
occasion with regard to the extensive information which the
representatives ought to possess, and the time that might be
necessary for acquiring it. This information, so far as it may
relate to local objects, is rendered necessary and difficult,
not by a difference of laws and local circumstances within a
single State, but of those among different States. Taking each
State by itself, its laws are the same, and its interests but
little diversified. A few men, therefore, will possess all the
knowledge requisite for a proper representation of them. Were
the interests and affairs of each individual State perfectly
simple and uniform, a knowledge of them in one part would involve
a knowledge of them in every other, and the whole State might
be competently represented by a single member taken from any
part of it. On a comparison of the different States together,
we find a great dissimilarity in their laws, and in many other
circumstances connected with the objects of federal legislation,
with all of which the federal representatives ought to have
some acquaintance. Whilst a few representatives, therefore,
from each State, may bring with them a due knowledge of their
own State, every representative will have much information to
acquire concerning all the other States. The changes of time,
as was formerly remarked, on the comparative situation of the
different States, will have an assimilating effect. The effect
of time on the internal affairs of the States, taken singly,
will be just the contrary. At present some of the States are
little more than a society of husbandmen. Few of them have made
much progress in those branches of industry which give a variety
and complexity to the affairs of a nation. These, however, will
in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced population,
and will require, on the part of each State, a fuller representation.
The foresight of the convention has accordingly taken care that
the progress of population may be accompanied with a proper
increase of the representative branch of the government.
The experience of Great Britain, which presents to mankind
so many political lessons, both of the monitory and exemplary
kind, and which has been frequently consulted in the course
of these inquiries, corroborates the result of the reflections
which we have just made. The number of inhabitants in the two
kingdoms of England and Scotland cannot be stated at less than
eight millions. The representatives of these eight millions
in the House of Commons amount to five hundred and fifty-eight.
Of this number, one ninth are elected by three hundred and sixty-four
persons, and one half, by five thousand seven hundred and twenty-three
persons.* It cannot be supposed that the half thus elected,
and who do not even reside among the people at large, can add
any thing either to the security of the people against the government,
or to the knowledge of their circumstances and interests in
the legislative councils. On the contrary, it is notorious,
that they are more frequently the representatives and instruments
of the executive magistrate, than the guardians and advocates
of the popular rights. They might therefore, with great propriety,
be considered as something more than a mere deduction from the
real representatives of the nation. We will, however, consider
them in this light alone, and will not extend the deduction
to a considerable number of others, who do not reside among
their constituents, are very faintly connected with them, and
have very little particular knowledge of their affairs. With
all these concessions, two hundred and seventy-nine persons
only will be the depository of the safety, interest, and happiness
of eight millions that is to say, there will be one representative
only to maintain the rights and explain the situation OF TWENTY-EIGHT
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY constituents, in an assembly
exposed to the whole force of executive influence, and extending
its authority to every object of legislation within a nation
whose affairs are in the highest degree diversified and complicated.
Yet it is very certain, not only that a valuable portion of
freedom has been preserved under all these circumstances, but
that the defects in the British code are chargeable, in a very
small proportion, on the ignorance of the legislature concerning
the circumstances of the people. Allowing to this case the weight
which is due to it, and comparing it with that of the House
of Representatives as above explained it seems to give the fullest
assurance, that a representative for every THIRTY THOUSAND INHABITANTS
will render the latter both a safe and competent guardian of
the interests which will be confided to it.
PUBLIUS
*Burgh's "Political Disquisitions."
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