The House of Representatives
From the New York Packet. Friday, February 8, 1788.
To the People of the State of New York:
FROM the more general inquiries pursued in the four last papers,
I pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts
of the government. I shall begin with the House of Representatives.
The first view to be taken of this part of the government relates
to the qualifications of the electors and the elected. Those
of the former are to be the same with those of the electors
of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. The definition
of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental
article of republican government. It was incumbent on the convention,
therefore, to define and establish this right in the Constitution.
To have left it open for the occasional regulation of the Congress,
would have been improper for the reason just mentioned. To have
submitted it to the legislative discretion of the States, would
have been improper for the same reason; and for the additional
reason that it would have rendered too dependent on the State
governments that branch of the federal government which ought
to be dependent on the people alone. To have reduced the different
qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule,
would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States
as it would have been difficult to the convention. The provision
made by the convention appears, therefore, to be the best that
lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every State,
because it is conformable to the standard already established,
or which may be established, by the State itself. It will be
safe to the United States, because, being fixed by the State
constitutions, it is not alterable by the State governments,
and it cannot be feared that the people of the States will alter
this part of their constitutions in such a manner as to abridge
the rights secured to them by the federal Constitution.
The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and
properly defined by the State constitutions, and being at the
same time more susceptible of uniformity, have been very properly
considered and regulated by the convention. A representative
of the United States must be of the age of twenty-five years;
must have been seven years a citizen of the United States; must,
at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the State he
is to represent; and, during the time of his service, must be
in no office under the United States. Under these reasonable
limitations, the door of this part of the federal government
is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive,
whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth,
or to any particular profession of religious faith.
The term for which the representatives are to be elected falls
under a second view which may be taken of this branch. In order
to decide on the propriety of this article, two questions must
be considered: first, whether biennial elections will, in this
case, be safe; secondly, whether they be necessary or useful.
First. As it is essential to liberty that the government in
general should have a common interest with the people, so it
is particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration
should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy
with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the
only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually
secured. But what particular degree of frequency may be absolutely
necessary for the purpose, does not appear to be susceptible
of any precise calculation, and must depend on a variety of
circumstances with which it may be connected. Let us consult
experience, the guide that ought always to be followed whenever
it can be found.
The scheme of representation, as a substitute for a meeting
of the citizens in person, being at most but very imperfectly
known to ancient polity, it is in more modern times only that
we are to expect instructive examples. And even here, in order
to avoid a research too vague and diffusive, it will be proper
to confine ourselves to the few examples which are best known,
and which bear the greatest analogy to our particular case.
The first to which this character ought to be applied, is the
House of Commons in Great Britain. The history of this branch
of the English Constitution, anterior to the date of Magna Charta,
is too obscure to yield instruction. The very existence of it
has been made a question among political antiquaries. The earliest
records of subsequent date prove that parliaments were to SIT
only every year; not that they were to be ELECTED every year.
And even these annual sessions were left so much at the discretion
of the monarch, that, under various pretexts, very long and
dangerous intermissions were often contrived by royal ambition.
To remedy this grievance, it was provided by a statute in the
reign of Charles II. , that the intermissions should not be
protracted beyond a period of three years. On the accession
of William III. , when a revolution took place in the government,
the subject was still more seriously resumed, and it was declared
to be among the fundamental rights of the people that parliaments
ought to be held FREQUENTLY. By another statute, which passed
a few years later in the same reign, the term ``frequently,''
which had alluded to the triennial period settled in the time
of Charles II, is reduced to a precise meaning, it being expressly
enacted that a new parliament shall be called within three years
after the termination of the former. The last change, from three
to seven years, is well known to have been introduced pretty
early in the present century, under on alarm for the Hanoverian
succession. From these facts it appears that the greatest frequency
of elections which has been deemed necessary in that kingdom,
for binding the representatives to their constituents, does
not exceed a triennial return of them. And if we may argue from
the degree of liberty retained even under septennial elections,
and all the other vicious ingredients in the parliamentary constitution,
we cannot doubt that a reduction of the period from seven to
three years, with the other necessary reforms, would so far
extend the influence of the people over their representatives
as to satisfy us that biennial elections, under the federal
system, cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite dependence
of the House of Representatives on their constituents.
Elections in Ireland, till of late, were regulated entirely
by the discretion of the crown, and were seldom repeated, except
on the accession of a new prince, or some other contingent event.
The parliament which commenced with George II. was continued
throughout his whole reign, a period of about thirty-five years.
The only dependence of the representatives on the people consisted
in the right of the latter to supply occasional vacancies by
the election of new members, and in the chance of some event
which might produce a general new election. The ability also
of the Irish parliament to maintain the rights of their constituents,
so far as the disposition might exist, was extremely shackled
by the control of the crown over the subjects of their deliberation.
Of late these shackles, if I mistake not, have been broken;
and octennial parliaments have besides been established. What
effect may be produced by this partial reform, must be left
to further experience. The example of Ireland, from this view
of it, can throw but little light on the subject. As far as
we can draw any conclusion from it, it must be that if the people
of that country have been able under all these disadvantages
to retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of biennial elections
would secure to them every degree of liberty, which might depend
on a due connection between their representatives and themselves.
Let us bring our inquiries nearer home. The example of these
States, when British colonies, claims particular attention,
at the same time that it is so well known as to require little
to be said on it. The principle of representation, in one branch
of the legislature at least, was established in all of them.
But the periods of election were different. They varied from
one to seven years. Have we any reason to infer, from the spirit
and conduct of the representatives of the people, prior to the
Revolution, that biennial elections would have been dangerous
to the public liberties? The spirit which everywhere displayed
itself at the commencement of the struggle, and which vanquished
the obstacles to independence, is the best of proofs that a
sufficient portion of liberty had been everywhere enjoyed to
inspire both a sense of its worth and a zeal for its proper
enlargement. This remark holds good, as well with regard to
the then colonies whose elections were least frequent, as to
those whose elections were most frequent Virginia was the colony
which stood first in resisting the parliamentary usurpations
of Great Britain; it was the first also in espousing, by public
act, the resolution of independence. In Virginia, nevertheless,
if I have not been misinformed, elections under the former government
were septennial. This particular example is brought into view,
not as a proof of any peculiar merit, for the priority in those
instances was probably accidental; and still less of any advantage
in SEPTENNIAL elections, for when compared with a greater frequency
they are inadmissible; but merely as a proof, and I conceive
it to be a very substantial proof, that the liberties of the
people can be in no danger from BIENNIAL elections.
The conclusion resulting from these examples will be not a
little strengthened by recollecting three circumstances. The
first is, that the federal legislature will possess a part only
of that supreme legislative authority which is vested completely
in the British Parliament; and which, with a few exceptions,
was exercised by the colonial assemblies and the Irish legislature.
It is a received and well-founded maxim, that where no other
circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is, the
shorter ought to be its duration; and, conversely, the smaller
the power, the more safely may its duration be protracted. In
the second place, it has, on another occasion, been shown that
the federal legislature will not only be restrained by its dependence
on its people, as other legislative bodies are, but that it
will be, moreover, watched and controlled by the several collateral
legislatures, which other legislative bodies are not. And in
the third place, no comparison can be made between the means
that will be possessed by the more permanent branches of the
federal government for seducing, if they should be disposed
to seduce, the House of Representatives from their duty to the
people, and the means of influence over the popular branch possessed
by the other branches of the government above cited. With less
power, therefore, to abuse, the federal representatives can
be less tempted on one side, and will be doubly watched on the
other.
PUBLIUS
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