The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency
of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
For the Independent Journal.
To the People of the State of New York:
AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that
which has been stated and answered, in my last address, may perhaps
be likewise urged against the principle of legislation for the
individual citizens of America. It may be said that it would tend
to render the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable
it to absorb those residuary authorities, which it might be judged
proper to leave with the States for local purposes. Allowing the
utmost latitude to the love of power which any reasonable man
can require, I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation
the persons intrusted with the administration of the general government
could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that
description. The regulation of the mere domestic police of a State
appears to me to hold out slender allurements to ambition. Commerce,
finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects
which have charms for minds governed by that passion; and all
the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first instance,
to be lodged in the national depository. The administration of
private justice between the citizens of the same State, the supervision
of agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature, all
those things, in short, which are proper to be provided for by
local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction.
It is therefore improbable that there should exist a disposition
in the federal councils to usurp the powers with which they are
connected; because the attempt to exercise those powers would
be as troublesome as it would be nugatory; and the possession
of them, for that reason, would contribute nothing to the dignity,
to the importance, or to the splendor of the national government.
But let it be admitted, for argument's sake,
that mere wantonness and lust of domination would be sufficient
to beget that disposition; still it may be safely affirmed, that
the sense of the constituent body of the national representatives,
or, in other words, the people of the several States, would control
the indulgence of so extravagant an appetite. It will always be
far more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national
authorities than for the national government to encroach upon
the State authorities. The proof of this proposition turns upon
the greater degree of influence which the State governments if
they administer their affairs with uprightness and prudence, will
generally possess over the people; a circumstance which at the
same time teaches us that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness
in all federal constitutions; and that too much pains cannot be
taken in their organization, to give them all the force which
is compatible with the principles of liberty.
The superiority of influence in favor of the
particular governments would result partly from the diffusive
construction of the national government, but chiefly from the
nature of the objects to which the attention of the State administrations
would be directed.
It is a known fact in human nature, that its
affections are commonly weak in proportion to the distance or
diffusiveness of the object. Upon the same principle that a man
is more attached to his family than to his neighborhood, to his
neighborhood than to the community at large, the people of each
State would be apt to feel a stronger bias towards their local
governments than towards the government of the Union; unless the
force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better administration
of the latter.
This strong propensity of the human heart would
find powerful auxiliaries in the objects of State regulation.
The variety of more minute interests, which will
necessarily fall under the superintendence of the local administrations,
and which will form so many rivulets of influence, running through
every part of the society, cannot be particularized, without involving
a detail too tedious and uninteresting to compensate for the instruction
it might afford.
There is one transcendant advantage belonging
to the province of the State governments, which alone suffices
to place the matter in a clear and satisfactory light,—I mean
the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice. This,
of all others, is the most powerful, most universal, and most
attractive source of popular obedience and attachment. It is that
which, being the immediate and visible guardian of life and property,
having its benefits and its terrors in constant activity before
the public eye, regulating all those personal interests and familiar
concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately
awake, contributes, more than any other circumstance, to impressing
upon the minds of the people, affection, esteem, and reverence
towards the government. This great cement of society, which will
diffuse itself almost wholly through the channels of the particular
governments, independent of all other causes of influence, would
insure them so decided an empire over their respective citizens
as to render them at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not
unfrequently, dangerous rivals to the power of the Union.
The operations of the national government, on
the other hand, falling less immediately under the observation
of the mass of the citizens, the benefits derived from it will
chiefly be perceived and attended to by speculative men. Relating
to more general interests, they will be less apt to come home
to the feelings of the people; and, in proportion, less likely
to inspire an habitual sense of obligation, and an active sentiment
of attachment.
The reasoning on this head has been abundantly
exemplified by the experience of all federal constitutions with
which we are acquainted, and of all others which have borne the
least analogy to them.
Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly
speaking, confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that
species of association. There was a common head, chieftain, or
sovereign, whose authority extended over the whole nation; and
a number of subordinate vassals, or feudatories, who had large
portions of land allotted to them, and numerous trains of INFERIOR
vassals or retainers, who occupied and cultivated that land upon
the tenure of fealty or obedience, to the persons of whom they
held it. Each principal vassal was a kind of sovereign, within
his particular demesnes. The consequences of this situation were
a continual opposition to authority of the sovereign, and frequent
wars between the great barons or chief feudatories themselves.
The power of the head of the nation was commonly too weak, either
to preserve the public peace, or to protect the people against
the oppressions of their immediate lords. This period of European
affairs is emphatically styled by historians, the times of feudal
anarchy.
When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous
and warlike temper and of superior abilities, he would acquire
a personal weight and influence, which answered, for the time,
the purpose of a more regular authority. But in general, the power
of the barons triumphed over that of the prince; and in many instances
his dominion was entirely thrown off, and the great fiefs were
erected into independent principalities or States. In those instances
in which the monarch finally prevailed over his vassals, his success
was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those vassals over their dependents.
The barons, or nobles, equally the enemies of the sovereign and
the oppressors of the common people, were dreaded and detested
by both; till mutual danger and mutual interest effected a union
between them fatal to the power of the aristocracy. Had the nobles,
by a conduct of clemency and justice, preserved the fidelity and
devotion of their retainers and followers, the contests between
them and the prince must almost always have ended in their favor,
and in the abridgment or subversion of the royal authority.
This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation
or conjecture. Among other illustrations of its truth which might
be cited, Scotland will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of
clanship which was, at an early day, introduced into that kingdom,
uniting the nobles and their dependants by ties equivalent to
those of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant overmatch
for the power of the monarch, till the incorporation with England
subdued its fierce and ungovernable spirit, and reduced it within
those rules of subordination which a more rational and more energetic
system of civil polity had previously established in the latter
kingdom.
The separate governments in a confederacy may
aptly be compared with the feudal baronies; with this advantage
in their favor, that from the reasons already explained, they
will generally possess the confidence and good-will of the people,
and with so important a support, will be able effectually to oppose
all encroachments of the national government. It will be well
if they are not able to counteract its legitimate and necessary
authority. The points of similitude consist in the rivalship of
power, applicable to both, and in the CONCENTRATION of large portions
of the strength of the community into particular DEPOSITS, in
one case at the disposal of individuals, in the other case at
the disposal of political bodies.
A concise review of the events that have attended
confederate governments will further illustrate this important
doctrine; an inattention to which has been the great source of
our political mistakes, and has given our jealousy a direction
to the wrong side. This review shall form the subject of some
ensuing papers.
PUBLIUS
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