Nuclear Risk Communication (2005)Bunn, Matthew and Anthony Wier Abstract: Evidence that terrorists are actively seeking nuclear weapons and the materials needed to make them, and that some nuclear stockpiles around the world remain dangerously vulnerable to potential theft and transfer to terrorist groups, continued to accumulate in the past year. A comprehensive strategy for preventing nuclear terrorism would include many strands, from offensive action against terrorists with global reach to measures to stop nuclear smuggling. But the most crucial element of such a strategy is to lock down every nuclear weapon and every kilogram of potential nuclear bomb material everywhere. Because nuclear weapons and their essential ingredients do not occur in nature and are too difficult for terrorists to plausibly produce on their own, if these stockpiles can be kept out of terrorist hands, nuclear terrorism can be reliably prevented. General Accounting Office Abstract: NRC and DOE studies indicate a low likelihood of widespread harm to human health from terrorist attacks or severe accidents involving spent fuel—either in transit or dry or wet storage. Spent fuel is a heavy, ceramic material that is neither explosive nor volatile and resists easy dispersal. Tests to date on shipping containers and dry storage containers have shown that, while they can be penetrated under terrorist and severe accident scenarios, their construction allows little release of spent fuel, with little harm to human health. While release of a large quantity of radioactive material from a wet storage pool is theoretically possible, such a release would require an extremely unlikely chain of events. For example, coolant would have to be drained from pools and the fuel left uncovered for a sustained period. Studies reveal that such an event would be extremely unlikely to occur by accident. To supplement the existing body of work on the safety and security of spent fuel, NRC has commissioned additional studies to address technical uncertainties and respond to heightened security concerns. Kelly, Dr. Henry Abstract: The President of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Dr. Henry Kelly, presented this testimony to Congress in 2002, on the dangers presented by radiological attacks, situations where nuclear materials could be released, without using a nuclear explosive device, for the malicious purpose of killing or injuring American citizens and destroying property. One point of emphasis is on the numerous industries that house nuclear materials, such as: university, corporate, and government research laboratories, irradiation plants, oil drilling facilities, medical centers, and other sites. Three case studies use differing radioactive substances in different population areas of the United States . In order to reduce access to nuclear materials, FAS recommends fully funding material recovery and storage programs, reviewing licensing, security requirements, and inspection procedures wherever nuclear material is stored, and funding research aimed at alternative energy means. Levi, Michael A. and Henry C. Kelly Abstract: The authors present a scenario in which a dirty bomb is set off in a major American city. It is their contention that such a bomb should be considered a weapon of mass disruption, as opposed to destruction. There are over 2 million sources of radioactive material in the United States that could render an area off-limits for an extended period of time, crushing the economy of that area. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has estimated that up to 1,500 pieces of industrial equipment have been lost since 1996, all of which contain some radioactive components. The HOTSPOT program was used to simulate the release of a cesium 137 in Manhattan . The economic fallout of such a release could total in the hundreds of billions.
Lugar, Richard G. Abstract: The post-Cold War era of non-proliferation policy began in 1991 with the conception of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to combat the WMD proliferation threat in the former Soviet Union . At that time, the vast nuclear, chemical and biological arsenal of the former Soviet Union had become an immediate and grave proliferation risk. Many weapons sites lacked basic defenses and safeguards. Soldiers and personnel guarding weapons and materials were poorly paid. The entire Russian economy was in shambles, increasing incentives for bribery and black market activity. Moreover, many weapons sites were located outside of Russia , in newly independent states such as Belarus , Ukraine and Kazakhstan . This created the possibility of an expansion of nuclear powers with unpredictable results. Former Senator Sam Nunn and I came together to write and promote legislation to establish a program that devoted American technical expertise and money for joint efforts to safeguard and destroy these vulnerable weapons and materials of mass destruction. We received invaluable encouragement, support and insight from leaders in the United States and the former Soviet Union who recognized the dangers of inaction. Murakami, Kenji and Richard Olsen Abstract: The break-up of the former Soviet Union in 1991, resulted in the creation of 14 newly independent States ( NIS ), besides the Russian Federation . Eleven states are known to have nuclear activities (including mining activities). These are Armenia , Belarus , Estonia , Georgia , Kazakhstan , Kyrgyzstan , Latvia , Lithuania , Tajikistan , Ukraine , and Uzbekistan . Three other states are known to have no nuclear activity or mining activity. These are Azerbaijan , Moldova , and Turkmenistan . This article, sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), examines the current safeguards to track and prevent the spread of nuclear materials in the NIS . Smigielski, David Abstract: In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union , the United States and Russia have developed a deep cooperation designed to assure the security of Russia 's nuclear arsenal. While a number of steps have been taken to consolidate and improve the security of Russia 's strategic nuclear arms, particularly under the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR or Nunn-Lugar), concern remains over the security of the Russian tactical nuclear weapons arsenal. In particular, a serious debate has arisen over the status of what are known as “suitcase nuclear weapons,” very small Soviet-era nuclear devices. This debate is all the more relevant when one considers the potential destruction that could occur should such a device fall into the hands of an organization like al-Qaeda. Smigielski, David and Michael Roston Abstract : The following summary is drawn from RANSAC's observation of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting regarding the nuclear capabilities of terrorist groups. This summary represents RANSAC's impression of the discussion, and none of these notes should be attributed as an official word-for-word transcript of the events.
Taylor, Eric R. Abstract: In 1996 the U.S. Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act on domestic preparedness for terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. That law directs various departments and agencies of the federal government to make available to state and local governments training and equipment to respond to acts of terrorism involving the use of radiological, biological, and chemical weapons. According to the chairman of a national panel on terrorism, however, the United States lacks a clear plan for meeting the needs of its citizens in the event of a terrorist attack, and the hodgepodge of local and federal agencies makes it unclear who is in charge of the existing program.
Wald, Mathew L. Abstract: A New York Times article summarizing a study done for Congress by the National Academy of Sciences on the plausibility of terrorists launching an attack on spent nuclear fuel pools at a nuclear power reactor. Louis J. Lanzerotti, the chairman of the committee that issued the report and a professor of physics at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, said the study group, “…identified several scenarios that could have serious consequences at some plants.” The public version of the study did not lay out which plants were most vulnerable, although experts say those are the older boiling-water reactors, where the fuel pool is high above the ground and the building is not designed to withstand strong internal pressures. |