
THE PROCESS OF (NONVIOLENT) REVOLUTION AND MAX WEBER'S ETHICS OF RESPONSIBILITY

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Weber dismissed pacifism as an inadequate orientation to modern social and political life. However, the ethical and methodological imperative of Gandhi's insistence on active nonviolence contention is illuminated by and consistent with Max Weber's "ethic of responsibility"—marked by both passion and proportion—in the relationship between motivations, means, and ends in social action. Therefore, Weber's insights add clarity Gandhi's nonviolent ethics and methods; Gandhi's nonviolent ethics and methods add clarity to Weber's understanding of responsibility in modern political and social life. This provides a key to understanding active nonviolence and building the (peaceful) future in the process of revolution.

INTRODUCTION

Does the form of political contention matter? What are individuals to do when facing political domination and threat? How should we approach the installation of peace? Recent empirical research claims that nonviolent contention is more effective, more likely to succeed and, at the same time, that military violence and violent warfare in general are decreasing in use and effectiveness for political goals.¹ Max Weber's "ethic of responsibility" helps to explain this turn to and effectiveness of nonviolence and provides insight into furthering the goal of peace. Notably, it is the process of contention that matters.

This paper is a continuation of arguments presented in an earlier publication in this journal titled "Virtue in the Nonviolence of William James and Gandhi" (*IJWP*, September, 2013: 55-81). The core question is centered in determining what might be an individual's responsibility in contemporary governance as a responsible modern citizen. In summary, the previous paper began with a consideration of William James' speech "The Moral Equivalent of War" and his praise for the civic duty and courage promoted domestically in times and preparation for war. I then argue that the discussion of virtue and nonviolence in M. K. Gandhi's writings gives a sufficient, and better, response to James' call for a moral equivalent of war because: 1) nonviolence promotes the civic virtues—courage, discipline, service to the collective, etc—that are promoted in war; 2) nonviolent action promotes greater civic virtue because it requires more courage and does not ignore or destroy others; 3) nonviolence is the preferred methodological approach because Truth is not destroyed in the process of nonviolent social action; finally, 4) the success

of nonviolent social contention has been empirically confirmed. An added feature of this paper is that the focus shifts slightly to address the dilemma of moving from violence to politics.²

Legitimate political power exists when force and violence are not employed.

Max Weber, though openly critical of the pacifists of his day (similar to William

James critique of pacifism in his "Moral Equivalent of war"), in his speech "Politics as a Vocation" actually provides important sociological insight into direct nonviolent contention. The ethical and methodological imperative of Gandhi's insistence on active nonviolence as the better form of contention is illuminated by Max Weber's "ethic of responsibility"—marked by both passion and proportion—in the relationship between motivations, means, and ends in social action. In fact, Weber's own understanding of the pitfalls of an exclusive focus on "fear" and "reward" as guiding principles of social action helps to qualify his own conclusions that politics is a field that involves the utilization of a means—violence—that is not legitimate in other realms of social life. Said another way, (legitimate) political power exists when force and violence are not employed.³ While Weber dismisses pacifism, nonviolent social action can clarify and reconfigure Weber's own important insights while remaining consistent with his overall writings.⁴

Weber's insights add clarity to M.K. Gandhi's nonviolent ethics and methods; Gandhi's nonviolent ethics and methods add clarity to Weber's understanding of responsibility in modern political and social life.

Max Weber, one of the fathers of sociology, is not known for his optimism. In fact, in one of his last public speaking engagements, "Politics as a Vocation," Weber cautioned that "not summer's bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness..."⁵ Should or can we be more optimistic than Weber? Mihai Nadin argues that humanity is threatened by the slow transition to the expansion of killing with "no reflection, no sense of wrong, no sense of guilt."⁶ Nadin's comments closely reflect much of Weber's perspective on modernity and the increasing emphasis on instrumental behavior. The founder of the concept of "nonkilling," Glenn Paige, writes: "The surprise insight...is that *what did not happen* [nuclear war, for example] explains why humanity lives today."⁷ Paige continues that this "turns upside down" the conventional view that history is the story of the struggle of good defeating evil in an epic (often violent) battle. In fact, Paige contends that in order for the human species to survive, "killing" attributes have somehow not extinguished "nonkilling" attributes.⁸

The "ethic of responsibility" offers a perspective on individual agency in the modern world.

The following will be more explicit in moving from individual action to social action and from violence to politics through the works of Max Weber, relying primarily on his speech "Politics as a Vocation."

Located within the vast Weberian corpus is a nuanced understanding of duty—the "ethic of responsibility"—that can help as a guide to answer ethical questions and guide social and political actions. Keep in mind that, for Weber, the most radical social changes come not from the centers of political power but from the margins.⁹ The "ethic of responsibility" offers a perspective on social ethics to guide the cognitive (how we think) and voluntarist (how we act) dimensions of individual agency in the modern world.¹⁰ For Mary Kaldor, those promoting control through violence are dependent upon "on fear and/or self-interest"; this can be undermined with the establishment of "inclusion, tolerance, and mutual respect" through the ethic of responsibility.¹¹

WEBER AND CONFLICT

Before further discussing Weber's conception of the ethic of responsibility, it is important to understand his beliefs about conflict. Weber believes that no honest observer of social life can deny the centrality and pervasiveness of conflict (*Kampf*) as an everyday feature covering all aspects of human life: "Conflict cannot be excluded from social life. One can change its means, its object, even its fundamental direction and bearers, but it cannot be eliminated." Conflict itself is neutral: it is neither good nor bad in itself.¹² Weber emphasizes a range of available possibilities for conflict, whether in the struggle for material resources, the "inner struggle of mutually loving persons for the subjective values and therewith, instead of compulsion, an inner control (in the form of erotic or charitable devotion)," or the "subjective conflict in the individual's own mind."^{12b} For Weber, conflict is present whether or not it is explicitly recognized or expressed. In fact, Weber contends that peace is not the absence of conflict, but rather "is nothing more than a change in the form of the conflict or in the antagonists or in the objects of the conflict."^{12c}

The ethic of responsibility is Weber's formulation of a stance adequate given the plurality of "spheres of life" (*Lebenswelt*) located in various modern institutional orders.

Therefore, conflict is key to Weber's understanding of the requirements of the ethical life. Far from simple rule-following, ethical life is rarely (if ever) unambiguous and conflict within the ethic of responsibility is constructed as a form of moral endeavor that emerges within the context of social interaction and within institutional life.¹³ The ethic of responsibility is Weber's formulation of a stance adequate given the plurality of "spheres of life" (*Lebenswelt*) located in various modern institutional orders—such as, religion, legal systems, economic systems, politics and arts—and the individual's view of the world (*Weltanschauung*) which is the conceptual or theoretical level.¹⁴ For Weber, modernity increases these tensions, rather than resolving them. In contrast, a state-centric approach to responsibility alleviates the citizen from these tensions because they perceive their responsibilities ending when they place their vote. Furthermore, for Weber,

tension and conflict are not simply to be resolved by the state, but rather can help to form mature personalities that drive democratic governance in healthy ways of dealing with conflict. The point is that we must exercise our agency and responsibility appropriately to engage in constructive conflicts. Chantal Mouffe continues this theme and describes healthy conflict as the engine that drives good democratic governance.¹⁵

In fact, Howard Zinn argues that citizens within a democracy must engage in permanent nonviolent social revolution. But how is one to go about this? To return to the earlier critique of the narrow focus on needs and rights, we need a more robust development of responsibility. Max Weber's ethic of responsibility provides a framework for monitoring both appropriate social action and social conflict.

WEBER ON POLITICS

Max Weber devotes very little energy directly to the topic of war and violent conflict in his works, though he was planning to do so. He writes a few sentences about power as the ability to do ones will over someone else.¹⁶ The modern state is famously defined by him as the human association that claims the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force. However, political order is made possible as violence becomes the means of last resort.¹⁷ "Politics as a Vocation" is devoted to why we obey, how we make decisions, why we decide to follow, and how we create legitimacy for our actions. In essence, how we can utilize political rather than violent solutions to conflicts. In this and his other works, he also pays close attention to both the intended and unintended consequences of actions and to the irony involved in historical events as different groups collaborate with each other and coordinate social action, and in balancing ideas and resources in the world.¹⁸ Weber develops the ethic of responsibility to deal with the uncertainties and fluidities in the social world and to develop a political orientation for individual social actions.

Weber quickly dismissed two prominent schools of thought oriented towards social action. He first dismissed the *Realpolitik* focus on fear and threat of coercion, the principle orientation of deterrence—the idea that peace can be achieved through force or the threat of force. Weber did not spend much time discussing this because he felt that this form of gaining

assent was not legitimate—by legitimate, he meant that obedience with this type of rule was successful only in the short term because people will wiggle out from under this form of rule as soon as they are able. History is filled with countless examples of where this is attempted and where the irony of unintended consequences work back to undermine this form of rule. Conflict scholar John W. Burton also recognizes the irony of history in that deterrence does not deter (for very long).¹⁹ Second, Weber then dismissed the approach that relies on self-interest and reward. Weber dismissed an orientation towards politics that was concerned solely with the self-interest of the individual (or the state)—a self that is unconcerned with others in the social world, and only concerned with the image that the

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self presents and the desires of the self. Weber dismissed both of these because he felt they are directed by “vanity.” Both views are concerned only with the “vanity” of the self. For Weber, the self requires a project outside of itself.²⁰ The unit of analysis for political life, for Weber, is not simply evaluated in terms of the individual or the collective; rather,

it is a relational social category. These evaluations do not simply give priority to the individual (the liberal focus on rights/needs) or priority to the collective (the communitarian focus on the collective good).²¹ These issues are explored in more detail below, especially in connection to Weber’s understanding of vanity.

“POLITICS AS A VOCATION”: A BRIEF SUMMARY

Max Weber’s speech began on the question of what makes a good political leader. Weber quickly transforms that question into the sociological question of *why do we obey?* For Weber, the important question that every citizen must answer is in whom do we grant legitimacy to rule over us? This is important because it is tied to Weber’s definition of the modern state—it controls the monopoly upon the legitimate means of violence. Hence, it is important because, ultimately, the state can kill you! After outlining his three, now-famous, “assents to authority”—charismatic, traditional,

and rational/legal—Weber argues that a population that consents to be governed is much more stable, in the long run, than a population which does not.

Weber quickly dismisses two prominent schools of political thought—those based in *reward* and those based in *fear*—because they are not socially stable—legitimate—in the long run. For Weber, fear and reward do not reach the required level of long-term internal social stability because people willfully and swiftly change allegiance under these conditions, either to escape domination or to receive greater reward.

Weber contrasts the “ethic of conviction” and the “ethic of ultimate ends” with an “ethic of responsibility.” The ethics of responsibility is the only orientation, for Weber, that properly connects the continuum of motivations-means-ends in the service of legitimate and civil social action that promotes self-governance. Weber’s social and ethical commitment to nonviolence is implicit. What is explicit is his preference for politics over violence and civil social action over self-indulgence.

a. Vanity and Social Ethics

Weber insists that the debate about the vocation of politics is ultimately about what kind of ethical posture is appropriate for modern social life.²² Weber laments a framework of moral deliberation that operates as an ethic of conviction or an ethic of ultimate ends and contrasts both with an ethic of responsibility. Both the ethics of conviction and the ethics of ultimate ends are inadequate for appropriate social life because neither properly connects the motivations, means, and ends of social action. From conviction, ethical worth is determined according to actions that issue from valued principles; from ultimate ends, ethical worth is determined by outcomes of actions. Weber eschews social action that overlooks the connections between the means and ends and social action that views other people instrumentally as ends for another’s pursuits.

Weber’s move to social action is important because it underscores another key concept he discusses: *vanity*. Weber explicitly heaps his disgust on politicians operating from a position of exclusive self-service and aggrandizement. For Weber, vanity is the worst sin of the politician. By extension, vanity is also the greatest sin of action. Being connected and

devoted to goals separate from the self is not the same, for Weber, as "vain self-reflection." Rather, vain self-reflection is "personally to stand in the foreground as clearly as possible" which reduces action to "being concerned merely with the 'impression'" that is made. A self divorced from a cause cannot be a mature personality. Weber explains: "the serving of a cause must not be absent if action is to have inner strength."^{22b} A self divorced from a cause lacks moral seriousness. However, establishing a commitment to a particular cause or goal is not enough, for several reasons.

First, the social world, especially politics, involves not only value orientations of one individual, but includes value orientations of many individuals and, therefore, actions in regards to one's own values can conflict with the value orientations of other's. Also, actions in the social world can conflict with the actions of others. From this, Weber establishes his choice

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for an ethic of responsibility in modern social life.

Second, Weber then asks why people obey. Why do people follow orders? He provides the well-known typologies of legitimacy: traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal. These are "legitimations" that people provide for giving their assent to obedience. Weber does not dismiss any

one of these positions—traditional, charismatic, or rational-legal—outright, but his description provides analytical frameworks, or typologies, available for critical reflection.²³ Weber's point is that compliance with a socio-political order based on perceived legitimacy contributes to long-term social stability because the consent and willingness of the followers provides the basis of social order. On the other hand, compliance based on fear and reward, compared to active consent, are unstable in the long run.²⁴

For the purposes here, moral philosophy represents a *Lebenswelt* and is embedded and demarcated in systematic relations to its rational application. Ethics, as used here, is more closely connected to *Weltanschauung* and the theoretical-reflexive level. Moral philosophy, on the other hand, is more closely associated with institutionally designed systems and rules. The tone of Weber's distinction between the two—ethics and morality—is established in the central question he raises in his speech: "What kind of

a man is to be allowed to put his hand on the wheel of history?" Weber relates this to a more general question that circles throughout his discussion of modernity. Weber, along with other of his German contemporaries, developed the concept of "personality"²⁵ as someone able to make good decisions given the indeterminacy of the social world. According to Weber, we are born individuals and persons, we must *become* personalities. This *becoming* is rooted in dedication to causes, values, and goals and proceeds through the individual's self-assessment as action that is rationally guided.²⁶ The personality is developed, for Weber, through a perceived consistency between action and meaning.

b. The Ethic of Responsibility: Passion and Proportion

Weber's conception of an ethic of responsibility is clarified when contrasted with *vanity* and the *ethic of conviction* and the *ethic of ultimate ends*, introduced earlier.

The ethic of conviction presupposes a hierarchical and rationally-ordered cosmos with accompanying non-conflicting values. The individual's responsibility begins and ends with obedience to the demand or action that accords with the cosmos, and the intention in obeying is the most important indicator of moral worthiness:

If an action of good intent leads to bad results, then, in the actor's eyes, not he but the world, or the stupidity of other men, or God's will who made them thus, is responsible for evil...The believer in [an ethic of conviction] feels 'responsible' only for seeing to it that the flame of pure intentions is not quenched [sic]: for example, the flame of protesting against the injustice of the social order.^{26b}

Weber's illustration of the person oriented by an ethic of conviction is the revolutionary who feels the inextinguishable demand for action on the basis of her convictions, and who, finding warrant for action in the rationally arranged cosmos, can embrace any means (withdrawal or violence) to bring about the desired ends. According to Weber, promoters of an ethic of conviction say that "The world is stupid and base, not I. The responsibility for the consequences does not fall upon me but upon the others whom I serve and whose stupidity or baseness I shall eradicate." For Weber, this


view is problematic because the social means and consequences of action are ignored.

In fact, Weber notes, “the absolute ethic just does not ask for ‘consequences’ and that is the decisive point.”^{26c} The ethic of conviction operates from a simple thesis: “from good comes only good.” The crucial point here is that an ethic of conviction focuses on intentions and motivations of actions while ignoring the means and ends of actions. What is missing is an analysis of the results of action, the consequences of participating in social life, and the compromises that are made along the way. The ethic of ultimate ends suffers similar criticism for Weber: the proponent of this view ignores the motivations and means for actions and concentrates solely on the outcomes of action. For Weber, it is not that one type of social action

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is necessarily more or less “rational” than another type of social action. The point is that origins, means, and ends must always be considered and evaluated to be considered responsible social actions. The tension in managing Aristotle’s virtues is maintained in Weber’s tripartite connection between origin, means, and ends of social action. Managing this tension requires continual evaluation and effort.

We can diagram this relationship below. The “ethic of responsibility” is designed not to overly accentuate one dimension, but as a guide to constantly monitor the relation between all dimensions.



After Weber simply dismissed two prominent forms of political thinking (those based in reward and fear) and two forms of orientation towards the social world (those based solely either in convictions or in ends) he provides a stance he believes adequate to the ethical necessities of power, action and reflection in the modern world. In summary, Weber acknowledged that individual citizens have a role to play in politics, if for no other reason than

they assent to following leaders. Stated another way, leaders need followers and therefore citizens need to reflect on why they are following. In terms of vanity, Weber was critical of actions based solely on self-interest, whether from fear or reward, because these provide a flimsy basis for social order since they are apt to change rapidly if/as the circumstances change. Social stability is better served through legitimacy, by willing consent. In terms of motivations-means-ends, Weber was critical of approaches that did not consider all three, as stated above. This leads Weber to the ethic of responsibility.

Weber's ethic of responsibility has several criteria—"passion and proportion"—that serve to properly orient social action. By *passion*, Weber refers to having an object of sincere interest outside of one's self, motivated by social goals and not simply one's own self-interest. By *proportion*, Weber refers to the connection between motivations, means, and ends that does not overly accentuate one element but keeps them in balance and considers each important in itself. For example, the ethic of conviction is concerned primarily with motivations, while the ethic of ultimate ends is concerned primarily with outcomes. For Weber, social and political action requires careful consideration of all three. As convenient as it may be to eschew the tensions involved in judgment, the risk involved in sincerely listening to other points of view, and the uncertainty of living in a social world that is an open system filled with interactions with other agents and follows the unexpected contours of unintended consequences, this is not an appropriate orientation, according to Weber. We act and participate in social life and therefore our actions have social consequences.

This participation in social and political life includes responsibilities individuals have towards their own motivations and towards others. These responsibilities can then be evaluated in terms of Weber's model of the relations among motivations, means, and ends of social action. However, although Weber provided ways to reflect on human social and political action, he did not provide a moral framework to follow. At the heart of the ethics of responsibility is the interrelated and irresolvable connection between motivations, means, and ends.²⁷ While some social and political orientations focus exclusively on either intentions or consequences, as noted above, mature social action continually monitors and assesses motivations, means, and ends involved in social action. Complicating matters,

and requiring even more robust monitoring of social action is the fact that social actions have unintended consequences. The ethic of responsibility is a guide for critical reflection on motivations and social action but does not resolve the tension inherent in civil society or between moral frameworks.

In this way, ethics is going beyond justifying moral frameworks. Ethics is the social act of seeking legitimacy.²⁸ Ethics is the further enhancing of civic engagement and respect, among contesting moral frameworks. Legitimacy itself is a relational attribute built on mutual recognition and reciprocity.²⁹ Mutual recognition and reciprocity can justify independent moral frames, but legitimacy requires something new—a new relationship between antagonists. New relationships require sincerity, a sincerity rooted in an authentic concern, not instrumental strategic actions.³⁰ In this way, responsibility is not

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limited to a vain accentuation that only includes in an analysis one's own needs, but must include others in a civic-minded responsibility.³¹

While providing a useful template to examine social action and providing criticisms of truncated accentuations pursued in other forms of political and

social theory (described above), a necessary role for tensions and conflict, and a prominent role for careful reflection and judgment, Weber had very little to say about the ontics of judgment. In other words, he had very little to say about what to do in a particular situation. In this sense, Weber is consistent with others who have focused on the ontological condition of judgment, from Aristotle to Bernard Williams, and with the openness and indeterminism of social life as presented by Anthony Giddens.³²

Weber would agree that individuals have basic needs and would agree with much of the focus on the importance of human rights. However, Weber would be critical of approaches that focus exclusively on human needs/rights and overlook responsibilities involved in social action—responsibilities we have towards others (as discussed in the previous article). For Weber, social action is not simply to be concerned with how others treat us and the benefits we receive from social life, but must take into account how we treat others and the responsibilities we have towards others. It is not “responsible” if we simply focus on the benefits of belonging to a collective and ignore the

costs. In the same way, Weber's methodological individualism disallows the forfeiting of individual liberty for the exclusive benefit of the collective. The ethic of responsibility demands that we consider others in our motivations for social actions, how we act, and how those actions impact other people.

ON VIOLENCE

As discussed in the previous article, Gandhi's nonviolence is informed by his ethical and methodical insights. Weber's descriptions and conclusions in "Politics as a Vocation" foreshadow much of Gandhi's arguments for active nonviolence. While Weber's writings may not be completely consistent with anti-war pacifism, since Weber acknowledged that the purpose of the state was to control the monopoly upon legitimate violence, Weber's writings can be understood as supporting

contemporary just war theory that puts extreme limits on the use of violence. Brian Orend³³ describes the fundamental purpose of the modern state as defense: "Defending its citizens from outside aggression by another state and (or non-state actor), and also defending its citizens against from predatory criminals."³⁴ The state is to protect individuals and com-

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munities. However, Orend continues, no one wants to live in a "realist paradise," rather we aspire to "reside in a community in which our values are reflected, in which we enjoy equal membership, recognition and even some fellow-feeling."³⁵ Echoing Weber, Orend critiques vulgar political realism and claims that states must treat other states with a level of mutual trust, respect, and cooperation; without it, "there is a downward spiral of mistrust, paranoia, and eventually [possibly violent] conflict."³⁶ Orend contends that the primary principle of concern when utilizing violence is that basic human rights must be respected. Aggressors, whether states or criminals, forfeit those rights of protection with the act of aggression when they violate the basic rights of others. Said another way, we lose our rights when we violate the rights of others; it matters how we treat other people, whether acting as a state or as individuals.

To have good neighbors and collectives, individuals and states must also be good neighbors and collectives. Without dismissing violence outright, Orend's task in his version of just war theory is to put extreme limits on the exercise of violence. To this end, Orend argues, in terms of war, that states should operate by carefully acknowledging three principles—*jus in bellum*, *jus ad bello*, and *jus post bellum*. First, wars must be fought for the right intentions, they must be conducted according to principles, and the outcomes must be fair. While these categories are open to debate, even among proponents of just war theory, they refer to conditions that are required to wage a war justly—restoring peace, protecting noncombatants, being fair in the settlement of war, etc. Importantly, the connection between starting a war, conducting a war, and ending a war “*must* be tied together into a coherent whole.”³⁷ Without further discussing the nuances and details of just war theory, for the purposes here, Orend's contemporary treatment of just war theory mirrors Weber's “ethic of responsibility”:

Motivations-----Means-----Ends
Jus in Bello-----*Jus ad Bellum*-----*Jus Post Bellum*

For Orend, even though it is permissible for states to go to war, there are extreme limits and war is rarely justified. The primary principle, aside from facing overt aggression, to guide just wars fits closely in this account with classical pacifism, as “police actions” for the purposes of humanitarian intervention³⁸—to ensure physical security, material subsistence, personal freedom, elemental equality, and social recognition as a person.³⁹

Policing may be required. But even though the state controls the monopoly upon the use of violence, it need not always be applied. In fact, according to Weber, the more legitimate state operates by consent, not by coercion.

WHY NONVIOLENT SOCIAL ACTION?

The ethic of responsibility offers a perspective on social ethics to guide the cognitive and voluntarist dimensions of both political action and individual agency in the modern world. Guided by passion and proportion in assessing the ongoing relationship between motivations, means and ends of social actions, it is imperative that both political and social actors consider the

intentions, the means, and the (unintended) outcomes of acting in the social world.

Nonviolent social action does not emerge from the center of Weber's understanding of power, at first glance. After all, Weber famously defined the state as the institution that controls the legitimate monopoly upon the use of violence. Individuals—since the social contracts of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau—have given up their right to use violence and have placed that in the state. That said, need the state exercise the use of violence? For many, the modern state has utilized violence unjustly in the protection of the interests of the elites who control or benefit directly from it. In fact, Jack Donnelly goes so far as to claim that the modern state is the primary violator of human rights.⁴⁰

This leads to a daunting dilemma: when facing oppression and violence, especially from the state, what are citizens to do? Many, including Orend, believe that nonviolent opposition against a tyrannical regime is hopeless or even foolhardy. However, recent research finds that the most successful contests against the state are 1) those that are nonviolent, and 2) those that convince the military and police not to utilize state violence are especially effective!

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Sharon Nepstad is one among a number who have evaluated civil resistance in the twentieth century. Nepstad evaluated six revolutionary attempts. Three succeeded—East Germany, the ousting of Pinochet, and the “Bloodless Revolution” in the Philippines. Three failed—the “Tiananmen Tragedy” in China, Panama, and the struggle in Kenya against Moi. She asked which civil resistance techniques had the greatest successful impact and which techniques helped regime leaders to maintain power.⁴¹ After examining a number of variables, she found that only one variable—inability of regime to enforce its sanctioning power—distinguished success or failure. While nonviolent contentions are twice as likely to succeed as violent opposition, security force defections and mutiny lead to a sixteen times more likely success rate.⁴² Drawing from the early work of Lewis Coser, threats enhance group cohesion.⁴³ Violent resistance

justifies violent retaliation; nonviolent contention poses a poignant ethical dilemma. For example, in the Philippines, after extensive training in non-violence, a crowd of men, women, children and the elderly stood in front of tanks and armed foot soldiers. An 81 year-old woman in a wheelchair stood and pronounced to the military: "you are one of us. You belong to the people. Come back to those to whom you belong."⁴⁴ Protestors appealed to the soldiers to defect, and they did. Ferdinand Marcos fled.

Why is nonviolence both responsible and effective social action? One of the most difficult dilemmas to overcome is to transition from violence to politics.⁴⁵ Importantly, nonviolent social action is a coherent connection between Weber's motivations, means, and ends. First, it adheres to principles of the ethic of responsibility. It does less harm to others and models the appropriate mode of civic engagement. Importantly, it also builds the norms and institutions of civil society in the process of revolution itself. With nonviolent strategies and tactics, the transition has already been made. For example, as Serbian nonviolent participants in *Otpor!* quickly realized in the ousting of Milosevic, nonviolent actions perform several functions. First, the ruling regime is undermined when legitimacy is removed; second, when troops refuse to shoot or otherwise deter citizens the regime can no longer defend itself; third, radical positive political change can be implemented through nonviolent action;⁴⁶ and, finally, institutions of democratic civic life are built in the process of revolution itself. Here is an example of Weber's hypothesis that change comes from the margins, not the center, of political life.

CONCLUSION: NONVIOLENCE AND RESPONSIBILITY— BUILDING THE FUTURE IN THE PROCESS OF CHANGE

Recall that for Weber, peace is not the absence, but the (nonviolent) management of ongoing and perpetual conflicts. As previously noted, recent just war theory is largely following in the footsteps of Weber's ethic of responsibility. Discussing the macro level, Orend contends that "instead of making the World War I mistake of...mandatory reparations...[the Allies after World War II] shunned the revenge paradigm and embraced the rehabilitative one...Thirty years later they [Germany and Japan] are peaceful and stable liberal democracies. They are both very good 'citizens' on the

Global Stage.”⁴⁷ Orend, in discussing just war, considers this “connecting the start and finish.” Orend echoes the application of Weber’s ethics of responsibility, insisting that just wars must include consistency between motivations, means and ends to be considered just. Revisiting Kant, the raw fact of military victory only provides changes in power relations; it does not and cannot change our moral assessment of a given revolution or war.⁴⁸

This discussion began in the earlier 2013 article with a consideration of William James’ *Moral Equivalent of War* and the virtues of civic duty and courage promoted in preparations and times of war. It was argued previously that Gandhi gives sufficient response to James’ call for a moral equivalent of war in that nonviolent action: 1) nonviolent action promotes the virtues—such as courage, discipline, service to the community, etc.—that war

promotes; 2) nonviolent action promotes greater virtue than war because nonviolent action actually requires *more* courage than violence and does not destroy others; 3) nonviolence is the preferred form of social action because if the nonviolent actor is wrong, she does not harm others; and 4) nonviolence is the preferred methodological approach because Truth is not

Weber’s ethic of responsibility is the basic human responsibility of self-governance, which includes a concern for human needs.

destroyed with nonviolence. The next section turned to Max Weber and his understanding of the ethic of responsibility as an orientation to social action appropriate to the modern world. Weber’s sociology of responsibility confirms Gandhi’s insights on nonviolent action and through the continual evaluation of the connection between motivations-means-ends offers some basic guidelines for critical self-assessment as well as evaluation of social action.

Weber’s ethic of responsibility is the basic human responsibility of self-governance.⁴⁹ The responsibility of self-governance approach includes a concern for human needs. However, self-governance goes beyond needs to include ways in which individuals participate in social and political life. With increased participation comes increased responsibility. Paige writes: “On the heels of the democratic era came post modern concern for broad participation in the shaping and sharing of all values, not just power or wealth. The world wide devotion to respect, self respect and respect for others supports

nonkilling.”⁵⁰ Gandhi’s insight is to create a fluid connection between them with the principled approach to nonviolence and incorporates the ethic of responsibility in resolving conflict. Gandhi explains: “Nonviolence is ‘not a resignation from all real fighting against wickedness.’ On the contrary, the nonviolence of my conception is a more active and real fight against wickedness than retaliation whose very nature is to increase wickedness.”⁵¹ In fact, Reinhold Niebuhr described Gandhi’s approach as “most undeniably nonviolent resistance rather than non-resistance.”⁵² This is important because, although both may use forms of coercion, the means and ends are not identical. Niebuhr explains that violent coercion is distinguished both in its intentions and consequences of destruction from those of nonviolent

The organizers of the American Civil Rights Movement were adamant that the civility in recognizing justice, such as the ethic of responsibility in human relationships, be presented to all, not just those with whom they loved.

resistance because nonviolent resistance does not intend destruction nor are the consequences as destructive.

Since most contemporary wars are intrastate rather than interstate,⁵³ we turn again to the example of the American Civil Rights Movement: using a nonviolent human responsibilities framework illuminates a constellation of dimensions that do not appear in an approach that concentrates exclusively on a rights and needs or on a violence and killing framework.⁵⁴ First, the organizers were adamant that the civility in recognizing justice, such

as the ethic of responsibility in human relationships, be presented to all, not just those with whom they loved. The movement was not designed to replace or defeat the opponents, but to live in society with the opponents and create a future society of inclusion. Ackerman and Duvall summarize twentieth-century nonviolent movements as teaching “individuals how to assume responsibility for their own action and make decisions about the substance of goals and the process of reaching them.”⁵⁵ These individuals were practicing democratic virtues and building civil society during the process of revolution.

Can violence be eliminated? Perhaps not.

Can the exercise of violence and killing be reduced? Yes.

The point is that nonviolent contentions are more effective than violent contentions and that the new (political) society can be built in the process of change. Nonviolent social mobilization, such as that inspired and led by Martin Luther King, Jr. and M.K. Gandhi, can and have furthered civic spirit and democratic institutions, and have brought positive and healthy change. Nonviolence provides a template of social action that is guided by and consistent with motivations, means and ends. Nonviolence (and other forms of non-exploitation) is consistent with Weber's ethic of responsibility and takes seriously social action and influence upon others.

Not only is it ethically appropriate, it is also realistic and pragmatic to pursue nonviolent action. Gene Sharp observes: "As recent as 1980, it was to most people unthinkable that nonviolent struggle—or people's power—would within a decade be recognized as a major force shaping the course of politics throughout the world."⁵⁶ Importantly, we can review the history of political thought to recover nonviolent insights. For example, in Plato is the ethical ideal of "non-injury"; in Plutarch, a "resort to the knife...shows a lack of skill...by the statesman..."; and, in Mencius, "he who, using force, makes a pretense at virtue is a tyrant..."⁵⁷ Similar to several contemporary anthropological accounts,⁵⁸ both violence and nonviolence are social constructions and we can read the classics of political philosophy in different ways, just as we can (re)construct society and social relations in different ways: "Classical texts supportive of violence can be reinterpreted to subtract lethality [and therefore]...retain and advance nonkilling insights."⁵⁹

Gandhi explicitly and Weber implicitly also challenge us to reevaluate our assumptions about violence. The assumption too many hold is that violence is not only inevitable, but that it is desirable as well. As one non-violent advocate writes: "It is as if medical scientists approached cancer as incurable and socially desirable."⁶⁰ He continues, the solution is not "to apply more disease. More cancer will not cure cancer." Nonviolence recognizes principled dissent against injustice and the misuse of power, and upholds the right to civil disobedience as an integral part of a democratic participation and governance.

For Weber, the ethic of responsibility requires an appropriate ethical orientation that includes recognition and respect for others in the connection between the motivations, means, and ends of social action and, for Gandhi, nonviolence maintains the consistency between them and builds

legitimacy in the process of revolution. The ethics of responsibility provides guidance as how to continually and effectively participate in (nonviolent) resistance, how to critique our own position, how to build and conduct healthy forms of conflict in political life, and ultimately how to move from violence to politics.

Notes

1. See Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism does not Work" *International Security* 31 (2) 2006:42-78; Ivan Arreguin-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephens, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolence* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2011); Dustin Ellis Howes, "The Failure of Pacifism and the Success of Nonviolence" *Perspectives on Politics* 11 (2) 2013: 427-446; Sharon Nepstad, *Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); and, Adam Roberts and Timothy Ash, *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

2. This is, but commonly only implicitly stated, the goal of the theoretical and practical scholarship and practice in the field of conflict and peace studies.

3. This contrast was explained decades ago in Hannah Arendt's *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970) and Gene Sharp's *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: P. Sargent Publishers, 1973).

4. See, for example, Guenther Roth and Wolfgang Schluchter, *Max Weber's Vision of History: Ethics and Methods* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); ...

5. See Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, edited and translated by H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958): 128.

6. Mihai Nadin, "A Utopia Worth Pursuing" *Toward a Nonkilling Paradigm*, edited by Joam Evans Pim (Honolulu: Center for Global Nonkilling, 2009): 380-288.

7. Glenn Paige, "Introduction" *Nonkilling History* (Honolulu: Center for Global Nonviolence, 2010): 9.

8. Glenn Paige, *Nonkilling Global Political Science* (Honolulu: Center for Global Nonkilling, [2002] 2009).

9. See Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, translated by Talcott Parsons (London: Routledge, 1976 [1906])

10. It should be acknowledged at the beginning that Max Weber did not believe that pacifism or that nonkilling is a posture adequate to address the complexities of the modern political world.

11. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007): 126-27.

12. For a contemporary discussion of the positive and negative aspects of conflict in democratic governance, see Chantel Mouffe, *On the Political* (London: Routledge, 2005): Chp 2.

12b. Max Weber, "The Meaning of Ethical Neutrality" *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, edited by A. Shills and Henry Finch (New York: Free Press, 1949): 26.

12c. Max Weber, "The Meaning of Ethical Neutrality": 26-27.

13. For further elaboration, see, for example, Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1985).

14. For overviews of Max Weber's writings, see Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1960); Randall Collins, *Max Weber: A Skeleton Key* (London: Sage, 1986); Arthur Mitzman, *The Iron Cage: An Historical Interpretation of Max Weber* (Oxford: Transaction Books, 1985); and Ken Morrison, *Marx, Durkheim and Weber: Formations of Modern Social Thought* (London: Sage, 1985).

15. Chantel Mouffe, *On the Political*, 2005.

16. See, Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, 2 Vols. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978).

17. For a nuanced discussion of Weber's definition of the state in light of moves of privatization of force, see Jorg Friedrichs, "The Privatization of Force and its Consequences: Unintended but not Unpredictable" in *Rethinking Security Governance*, edited by Christopher Daase and Cornelius Friesendorf (New York; Routledge, 2010).

18. See especially *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* where Weber examines the historical irony that austerity and radical otherworldliness, rooted in religious life and based (at least partially) in the doctrine of predestination was, the engine that drove the development and success of capitalism in the West and especially in the United States.

19. John W. Burton, Deviance, *Terrorism and War: The Art of Solving Unsolved Social Problems* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979).

20. This is closely connected with Weber's understanding of the connection between means and ends—an individual should never be a means to another's ends. Relationships should not be purely instrumental but should rather be based in ethical concern for self and the other.

21. For a more thorough discussion, see Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982).

22. It is here that Weber's contributions to the *Methodenstreit* (the debate over methods) at the end of the 19th Century are informative, especially as Weber concentrated on the relationship between means and ends.

22b. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," 117.

23. To understand one of the reasons Weber did not provide explicit advice for the details of political decision-making is, in "Science as a Vocation," because he felt the professor's role was to analyze society, not to tell people what to think.

24. See also, Randall Collins, *Macro History: Essays in Sociology of the Long Run* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

25. See E. Portis "Max Weber's Theory of Personality" *Sociological Inquiry* 48 (2) 1978: 113-120; and Karl Lowith, *Max Weber and Karl Marx* (London: Routledge, 1982).

26. Bradley Starr, "The Structure of Max Weber's Ethic of Responsibility" *Journal of Religious Ethics* 27 (1999): 407-34.

26b. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," 121.

26c. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," 120.

27. Morton Kaplan, "Means/Ends Rationality" *Ethics* 87. 1. (1976): 61-66.

28. For discussions, see Jeff McMahan, *The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) and Adi Ophir, "Evil, Evils, and the Question of Ethics" in *Modernity and the Problem of Evil* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005): 188-198.

29. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Why Deliberative Democracy?* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004): 98.

30. Jurgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, translated by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985).

31. For an extended discussion, see Chantel Mouffe, *On the Political* (London: Routledge Press, 2005): Chp 1.

32. See also Stephen Shapin, *A Social History of Truth* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994): Chp 2.

33. Brian Orend is not the only scholar advocating just war theory, but for the sake of brevity his discussion of just war theory is dealt with exclusively here.
34. Brian Orend, *The Morality of War* (Toronto, Broadview Press, 2006): 83.
35. Orend, *The Morality of War*, 229.
36. Orend, *The Morality of War*, 233.
37. Orend, *The Morality of War*, 262.
38. Mark J. Allman, *Who Would Jesus Kill*, 65.
39. Orend, *The Morality of War*, 33-35.
40. Jack Donnelly, *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).
41. Sharon Nepstad, *Nonviolent Revolutions*, 124-135.
42. Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, Chp 1.
43. Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Group Conflict* (New York, Free Press, 1956).
44. Nepstad, *Nonviolent revolutions*, 120.
45. Craig Zelizer, ed., *Integrated Peacebuilding Innovative Approached to Transforming Conflict* (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 2013): Chp 1.
46. "Exporting Nonviolent Revolution, From Eastern Europe To The Middle East", *Radio Free Europe*, Wednesday, 12 February, 2014.
47. Brian Orend, *War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective* (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2000): 194.
48. Immanuel Kant *Metaphysics* 169-71.
49. For more elaboration of "peace-as-governance" see Oliver Richmond, *The Transformation of Peace* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007):52-84.
50. Paige, *Nonkilling Global Political Science*, 117.
51. Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Young India*, October 8, 1925.
52. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, [1932] 1960): 243.
53. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 2007.
54. See Peter Ackerman and Jack Duvall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Palgrave, 2000) for a summary of twelve 20th century cases of successful nonviolent struggles, including the American Civil Rights Movement.

55. Ackerman and Duvall, *A Force More Powerful*, 2000: 468.
56. Gene Sharp, "The Intifadah and Nonviolent Struggle," in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Issue 73, (Autumn 1989):3-13, 4.
57. Plato, Plutarch, and Mencius quoted in Paige, *Nonkilling Global Political Science*, 85-86.
58. Douglas Fry, *The Human Potential for Peace: An Anthropological Challenge to Assumptions about War and Violence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Keith Otterbein, "A History of Research on Warfare in Anthropology" in *American Anthropologist* 101, no. 4 (1999): 794-805; Leslie Sponsel, "Reflections on the Possibilities of a Nonkilling Society and a Nonkilling Anthropology." *Toward a Nonkilling Paradigm. Honolulu: Center for Global Nonkilling* (2009): 35-70. See also, Terry Beitzel, "Living with Ambiguity, Risk and Responsibility" *Nonkilling Futures: Visions* (Honolulu: Center for Global Nonkilling, 2012): 55-98.
59. Paige, *Nonkilling Global Political Science*, 86.
60. Paige, *To Nonviolent Political Science: From Seasons of Violence* (Honolulu, HI: Center for Global Nonviolence, 2001): 64.

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