BOOK REVIEWS

CRIMINALIZED POWER STRUCTURES: THE OVERLOOKED ENEMY OF PEACE

Michael Dziedzic, ed.
Lanham, MD. Rowan & Littlefield. 2016.
430 pages. $45.00

COMBATING CRIMINALIZED POWER STRUCTURES: A TOOLKIT

Michael Dziedzic, ed.
Lanham, MD. Rowan & Littlefield. 2016.
207 pages. $35.00

The two exemplary volumes, *Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemy of Peace* and *Combating Criminalized Power Structures: A Toolkit*, edited by Michael Dziedzic, first provide a crucially important examination of an often overlooked obstacle to the success of any peace process—criminalized power structures (CPS)—which undermine peace efforts and therefore must be understood and resolved and, second, provide ways to examine and confront CPS. Alongside the formal power structures and root causes of conflict, typically addressed by peace processes, are CPS which can represent both informal and formal networks that benefit from the conflict and undermine peace processes. Since CPS networks can create and drive the conflict or can be created within the context of the conflict itself, it is important to recognize the type of CPS. Dziedzic and his coauthors utilize structured focus comparison to examine ten cases and develop a typology of three types of peace process spoilers. If the Introduction and Chapter 13 alone, which provide the broader insights, findings, and recommendations, do not convince you to study this compilation then you probably should not be trying to do humanitarian aid, intervention, post-conflict development, or capacity-building work.

First, Dziedzic and the contributing authors have vast experience in peace processes and first-hand experience with CPS and also further the work of Stephen Stedman's under-utilized 1997 "Spoiler Problems in Peace

Processes." The defining characteristic of a CPS is "the nexus between illicit wealth and political power" and they are problematic because they can capture the state, constitute an armed opposition to the state, or both, and are rarely a consideration in projects and efforts to move from violence to legitimate politics (p. 10). Importantly, CPS must be distinguished from other forms of organized crime and corruption, because CPS attempt to capture and exploit the state (p. 13). Second, the authors examine the literature on the debate between greed and grievance as drivers of violent conflict and conclude that the networks of CPS can utilize and mobilize both (See p. 17). Third, the authors provide, in the second volume, ways international and domestic actors can deal with CPS.

The extent of coverage is broad and leads to the development of a typology of types of spoilers because, quoting Stedman, "the choice of an appropriate strategy requires the correct diagnosis of the type of spoiler" (p. 372). The key feature is that not all CPS are identical and therefore require different strategies to address them. The cases are divided according to type of spoiler. Chapters 2 through 5 deal with "irreconcilables"—Bosnia, Guatemala, Haiti, and Sierra Leone—who are unwilling to compromise and therefore must be removed. This requires intelligence-led operations by the legal system and enforcement of the rule of law, and the development of an accountability regime. This can take several forms, but success requires focusing on security and including in the mission and mandate hybrid legal systems between the international and domestic communities backed by a robust military and police contingent. Chapters 6 through 8 deal with "Violent Opposition, Negotiable Interest"—Kosovo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Iraq (Jaish al-Mahdi)—who are opponents to the peace process but can be converted into supporters of the peace process and stabilization. This involves combining law enforcement with nonviolent alternatives for the pursuit of political aspirations and wealth through legitimate means. This strategy is termed "conflict transformation" which shapes the context by dismantling or disrupting the CPS, developing the capacity of institutions for resolving disputes politically not violently, and nurturing safeguards for the legitimate exercise of force and power to maintain accountability. Finally, chapters 9-11 deal with "Supporters of the Peace Process"—Columbia, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Maliki regime)—and evaluate "success" in terms of whether illegitimate means to accumulate

wealth or political power are eliminated to protect against returning to violence or from developing into a kleptocracy.

From the list of problems, the solution is primarily in the cessation of violence, creating the rule of law with adequate institutional support, providing legitimate means to wealth and governance, accountability, transparency, and discerning which international and domestic elements are part of the problem or part of the solution. Two further complications are that a given context often has a mix of CPS and that CPS can learn and adapt to obstacles as well. In addition, international missions rarely arrive with proper understanding of the situation in strategy, rarely include a mandate to address the full range of CPS obstacles, and are slow to adapt to the context as it inevitably changes.

As documented, some missions failed spectacularly while others succeed. Success requires properly identifying type of spoiler and tailoring the strategy for each of the three types. "Irreconcilables" must be defeated with coercive force while dealing CPS with "negotiable interests" requires raising the costs using illegitimate means by using coercive force. For a CPS supporting the peace process, however, coercive force is inappropriate. Elements of all three strategies are usually required, in tandem. This requires discernment in first, diminishing the drivers of conflict, second, institutionalizing more attractive political alternatives for the pursuit of wealth and power, and, finally, developing legitimate institutional capacity to prevent state capture and future abuse of power (p. 371-72).

Dziedzic, et. al., have analyzed and extracted important lessons from the ten case studies, identifying both strategies that have worked and those that have failed in dealing with CPS. Proper assessment and strategic planning, providing adequate authority and understanding prior to initiating a mission, and severing the flow of illicit revenue and power must proceed before "capacity building." This is crucial because intervention brings resources which can be coopted and become part of the problem. Therefore, accountability measures and procedures—especially for the rule of law—are required at the domestic and international levels.

Dziedzic and his coauthors have assembled a tremendously important collection of case studies to further the work of peacebuilding. The focus is primarily on incentive structures and avenues and less on Gandhian-styled personal transformation; more on large-scale interventions (such as the

United Nations) and less on small-scale interventions. The authors provide a wealth of useful information for practitioners and researchers alike. One, among many, example is that CPS must first be understood as a security priority and not simply dismissed as a long-term development issue (p.267)! A second example is the irony of unintended and perverse consequences. Perhaps the most important lesson is that attempts at development and capacity-building require first the establishment of security and the rule of law. The second volume, *Combating Criminalized Power Structures: A Toolkit*, is equally remarkable in that it provides 17 chapters with direct strategies to counter the "overlooked enemies of peace." These two volumes both identify problems and puzzles of peacebuilding and provide possible solutions. To repeat, if you are not reading this impressive two volume compilation by Dziedzic you should probably not be involved in peacebuilding, development, or capacity-building efforts!

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