In what is a unique insight into two Gazan institutions unstudied in the past, Jensen is surely right even ten years after his extended stay in Gaza when he concludes that it is ‘time to realize that lasting peace must be inclusive and there can be no peace without Hamas’.

In From Bullets to Ballots, David L Phillips adopts a prescriptive approach detailing how to pacify a heterogeneous group of Islamist groups, from Hizbullah and Hamas to the Kurdistan Worker’s Party and the Free Aceh Movement. His conflation of Saddam Hussein’s gassing of the Iraqi Kurds and the Hiroshima bombing, as well the equivalence of the African National Congress (ANC) and Irish Republican Army (IRA) struggles against ‘repressive regimes’, are likely to agitate many from the outset. Confronted by Islamist groups, Phillips advocates a blend of confrontation, coercion and co-operation. In addition to the dozens of typographical errors that break up the fluency of the text, at times Phillips appears glib, with his approach to fundamental issues reductionist.

**Phillips states the movement has always been committed to wiping Israel off the face of the earth**

In his discussion of Hizbullah he states that the Party of God is committed to perpetual jihad. The evidence of Hizbullah’s political, military and social activities over the past twenty-five years does not support this. The Lebanese Muslim and Christian communities’ hatred of Israel’s occupation of the Shebba Farms cannot be dismissed by describing the contested area as ‘postage sized’. Phillips’ statement that President Clinton was unable to secure peace between Israel and Palestine because of ‘the degree of Palestinian intransigence’ reveals either a lack of objectivity or a lack of historical knowledge, or both. Stating that hundreds died on both sides in the Hizbullah-Israel conflict of 2006 reveals a problematic moral equivalence. Twenty-seven times the number of Lebanese civilians were killed as were Israeli civilians. Broad claims, ranging from detailing Hizbullah’s ‘network of terrorist cells and training camps in Asia, Europe and in South America’ to North Korean assistance in the provision of tunnels in South Lebanon and Saudi royal family financial support to Hamas, remain unsubstantiated.

In contrast to Jensen’s nuanced understanding of the evolution of Hamas as a social movement, Phillips states the movement has always been committed to wiping Israel off the face of the earth. However, many within Hamas aspire to restore Palestinian rights within the 1967 borders. As senior Hamas figure Imad Al-Alami stated, ‘it is with a heavy heart, but I do accept the existence of Israel within its 1967 borders’. Phillips’ assertion of operational links between Al-Qa’ida and Hamas also ignores the vociferous arguments between the two, with Hamas rejecting attempts by Al-Qa’ida to expropriate the Palestinian cause. Despite being a self-professed human rights advocate, Phillips’ glib description of human rights violations as ‘cutting corners’ and his assertion that any civilian who aids terrorists is a legitimate target misses the far broader debate between resistance (muqawama) and terrorism (irhab). Whilst President Obama’s speech to the Muslim world studiously avoided problematising Islam and opted to use the term violent extremism rather than terrorism, Phillips is happy discussing the pros and cons of targeted killings.

Phillips concludes that the ‘template of case studies in this book can be used to identify trends and develop strategies aimed at influencing the conduct of violent Muslim movements as well as the regimes that harbor or support them’. This is not supported by the evidence presented in the book. The absence of a contextual look at the variegated ecologies from which Muslim movements emerge stands in marked contrast to Jensen’s qualitatively superior empirical approach.

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**Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World**

*Martin N Murphy* Hurst, 2009

For most of the last century, the Western mind has largely relegated piracy to the realm of fantasy, whether literary or, more recently, cinematographic. As naval analyst Martin Murphy notes in Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money, ‘this perception has been moulded partly by the elimination of piracy from the Atlantic and Mediterranean worlds’ by the end of the nineteenth century and partly by evolving legal definitions.

The harsh realities of violence on the high seas – which, in point of fact, continued with little interruption in some corners of the globe – seem to have returned with a vengeance as one is confronted by the statistics of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB). These show 293 actual and attempted attacks on merchant shipping in 2008, 111 of which took place in either the Gulf of Aden or the waters off the eastern coast of Somalia. More worrisome still is the apparent upward trend in the number of incidents: the IMB recently reported 102 attacks in the first quarter of this year alone, of which sixty-one were the handiwork of marauders hailing from Somalia, a country which – apart from the portion constituting the territory of the internationally unrecognised “Republic of Somaliland” – has had no effective central government since 1991 and whose current ‘Transitional Federal Government’, the fourteenth such entity, is besieged by an Islamist insurgency, spearheaded by a group that has been
formally designated a ‘foreign terrorist organisation’ by the United States.

In a world in which, since the events of 11 September 2001, governments have dedicated considerable resources to contemplating possible scenarios for future attacks, the idea that pirates and terrorists might co-operate attracts a lurid fascination. While it is true that several factors which favour piracy also facilitate terrorist activity, does it necessarily mean that the former presages the latter? In his comprehensive study, Murphy, formerly the inaugural research fellow at the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at King’s College, London, and now a senior fellow at the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, exhaustively reviews both the forms which piracy phenomena assume in the contemporary world together the concept of maritime terrorism, in order to determine similarities and linkages as well as the threat they present to international security.

**Piracy is linked to events on land by a half-hidden chain of menace**

While piracy may have been around since time immemorial, its legal definition has shifted over time as customary international law – which had branded pirates as *hostis humani generis* and whose crimes *jure gentium* could be prosecuted by any state – was codified by draftsmen who mistakenly viewed piracy as ‘a problem out of history’ and thus operated from the notion that ‘the rights and prerogatives of states have always and everywhere taken precedence over any measures to prevent and suppress the problem’. After contending with the difficulties in defining the phenomenon, the author examines both the reasons for piracy (‘a low-risk, criminal activity that pays well’) and the factors, largely constant over time, which have encouraged it: legal and jurisdictional opportunities; favourable geography; conflict and disorder; underfunded law enforcement and/or inadequate security; permissive political environments; cultural acceptability; and reward. He then proceeds to look at the methods of attack, their frequency, and the economic costs which result, before studying in detail six regions where incidents have been concentrated: Southeast Asia, the South China Sea, the Bay of Bengal/Bangladesh, South America, East Africa, and West Africa. The conclusion Murphy arrives at is that contemporary piracy as such is a global phenomenon, but would not constitute a significant problem in absolute terms were it not for the fact that the attacks ‘are linked to events on land by a half-hidden chain of menace that can have consequences for regional and international security’.

**Maritime lawlessness can no longer be ignored as a marginal phenomenon**

Moving from the criminal enterprise of piracy to political violence, Murphy outlines the wide range of possibilities presented by ships as iconic, economic, and mass casualty targets as well as weapons. However, a review of the rather small actual number of terrorist incidents that have taken place on the water, and the handful of organisations which have been responsible for them, leads to the conclusion that ‘all these groups have found it difficult to achieve the equivalent psychological effect from the sea that they can on land’ and ‘the risks of concentrating their forces outweighs the potential gains’. Nonetheless, terrorists have found the maritime environment conducive to some of their ends, including the movement of men and materiel, for many of the same reasons that pirates and other criminals have found the vast space of the seas an opportune arena in which to obscure their movements. Despite these commonalities, however, Murphy concludes that ‘no concrete links between pirates and terrorists have so far been uncovered’. This volume, however, was completed in mid-2008, before the Harakat Shabaab Al-Mujahidin (‘Al-Shabaab’) – a group loosely linked with Al-Qa’ida – seized control of large parts of southern and central Somalia. It therefore does not include evidence that has since emerged of an apparent ‘marriage of convenience’ between the militants and some pirate gangs.

Throughout history, the oceans have had an anarchic dimension, although the extent of the disorder has varied and has usually been correlated to the relative strength or weakness of governance on land. As the trends persist of highly organised criminal syndicates and transnational terrorist networks opportunistically going out to sea in growing numbers to seek out potential targets, the threat that the two challenges pose to international order, either separately or in possible co-operation with each other, means that maritime lawlessness can no longer be ignored by security analysts as a marginal phenomenon. In coming up to speed on this reality, specialists and general readers alike will find Murphy’s broad, systematic treatment of the subject an excellent starting point.

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**Your Problem, Our Story: A Management Guide to Handling Emergencies and the Media**

*Philip Algar*

Matfield Books, 2008

The role of the media in emergencies is two-fold. On the one hand it gathers news and reports the event, and on the other it is part of the response, an agency through which vital messages can be communicated quickly and efficiently. Engaged with properly, the media can be