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Courtesy of Muse De Blerancourt, France, and Montpelier
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Posterity and the Union
In retirement, Madison holds court as
sole remaining founding father
James Madison
The Key to Our Nation
A Five-Part Series by Devin Bent
In the spring of 1817, James Madison stepped down from the presidency
and left Washington, D.C., to retire with Dolley to Montpelier, the
estate he had inherited from his father. During a brief part of the
trip home aboard a steamboat on the Potomac, Madison was "as playful
as a child," like "a school Boy on a long vacation."
One can understand his euphoria. He was bidding farewell to a career
of astonishing achievement -- and something unprecedented in history
-- the founding of a republic of disparate factions and vast geography.
And during his second term as president, he had averted a near-disastrous
end to his beloved republic, by steering America through its second
war of independence against Britain. He rode a wave of popularity homeward.
Madison spent the remaining 19 years of his life at
Montpelier, still focused on the Union and laboring for posterity. He
compiled the diligent notes he had kept during the Constitutional Convention,
the preparation of which, for posthumous publication, is his most significant
accomplishment during these years. He helped Thomas Jefferson establish
his university and served as rector after Jefferson's death. He expended
efforts as president of the American Colonization Society, attempting
to resettle freed slaves to Africa. Madison also publicly engaged one
last national crisis that threatened to dissolve the Union --
namely, South Carolina's attempt at nullification, which culminated
in 1832.
But, above all, throughout these years, Madison attended
to the numerous visitors and letters that arrived at Montpelier, usually
seeking his insight and recollections about the republic's seminal events,
its founders' intentions and its Constitution. When he responded, he
wrote carefully and at length as he knew he addressed posterity as much
as the individual recipient of his thoughts. His responses took on greater
significance as Madison's generation of companions, adversaries and
allies in nation-building passed away, one by one, until he remained
the sole founding father.
By the early 1820s, as Madison began organizing his
cache of papers and letters, many people urged him to publish his notes
on the convention to counter those of staunch anti-federalist Robert
Yates, who had attended only seven of the 16 weeks of sessions. Published
posthumously in 1821, Yates' was the first public record of what transpired
inside Convention Hall in 1787 but contained, according to Madison,
"egregious errors" and "erroneous" and "mutilated"
transcriptions of delegates' speeches. Still, Madison remained firm
-- his own notes could only be published after his death.
For one, he aimed to honor the Convention's sworn policy
of secrecy about the constitutional debates, which had allowed all the
delegates to speak freely, without embarrassment of public disclosure
of positions taken or subsequently changed. Two, Madison determined
that the new generation of leaders must grapple with the problems of
self-government through their own interpretation and application of
the Constitution. As Madison explained to a friend in a letter, he wanted
to "delay [publication] till the Constitution should be well settled
by practice, and till a knowledge of the controversial part of the proceedings
of its framers could be turned to no improper account."
No other surviving delegate to the Convention in later
years could match Madison's range of political experience -- a representative
in Congress, Secretary of State and President -- under the Constitution.
The `Notes on Convention' complete an incredible set of documents from
events in which Madison played a critical role.
Time's passing, Madison believed, would also enable
Americans to see his notes -- and events of the Convention --
with fresh eyes. "[A]fter a certain date," he wrote in 1827,
"the older such things grow, the more they are relished as new;
the distance of time like that of space from which they are received,
giving them that attractive character." In his will, Madison bequeathed
all his papers to Dolley, "having entire confidence in her discreet
and proper use of them," and he also expressly entrusted to her
complete authority to direct the publication of his notes. The sale
of his notes to Congress would provide the major source of her financial
support during the remaining years of her life.
As Madison envisioned, scholars find his notes are the
best source of information on the Convention debates. Underlying the
notes is Madison's basic premise that Americans (after some "practice"
under the Constitution) can better understand the Constitution through
knowledge of the process by which it was drafted and adopted. It was
through that process, including ratification "by the people,"
that it derived its legitimacy, after all.
The notes' unique value also accrues from their compiler's
personal experience and prestige. No other surviving delegate to the
Constitutional Convention in later years could match Madison's range
of political experience -- a representative in Congress, secretary
of state and president -- under the Constitution. The "Notes
on the Convention" complete an incredible set of documents from
events in which Madison played a critical role.
Though Madison intended to remain aloof from politics
when he left Washington, one last national emergency -- nullification
-- drew him back into battle in 1828. The crisis was rooted in
the diverging interests of the South's expanding cotton-and-slave economy
and the North's burgeoning industrialization. As early as 10 years before
nullification erupted, Madison worried that, "Should a state of
parties arise founded on geographical boundaries, and other physical
and permanent distinctions which happen to coincide with them, what
is to control these great repulsive masses from awful shocks against
each other?"
A federal tariff on imported goods -- particularly
those purchased by southerners -- enacted by northern Congressmen
precipitated the nullification crisis, which was led by South Carolina's
John C. Calhoun. This longstanding nationalist was first and foremost
devoted to his home state and, despite serving President Andrew Jackson
as his vice-president, developed the doctrine that a state may choose
to nullify a federal law. He and others argued that tariffs impoverished
South Carolina and were unconstitutional because they were passed solely
to protect northern industry. As precedent for his doctrine, Calhoun
cited none other than Jefferson's Kentucky and Madison's Virginia resolutions
of 1798, which had opposed the Alien and Sedition Acts of John Adams'
administration.
Madison adamantly opposed Calhoun. The impoverishment
of South Carolina and other southern states east of the Appalachians
had less to do with the tariffs and more to do with the availability
of new fertile land (necessary for growing cotton) available in the
west. "How could it happen otherwise than that thousands would
sell their less productive lands ... and transfer their labour to a
region easily accessible, and hence its trebled fruits would be almost
as cheaply transported to the common market as from the region abandoned?"
Madison wrote.
On the matter of the constitutionality of tariffs, Madison
countered that from the republic's beginning tariffs had been used without
controversy to protect American industries. There had been past disagreements
about specific policies and their merit, but no argument about the constitutionality
of the practice.
For Madison, this test of time was the ultimate determinant.
As he wrote concerning a national bank, "A construction of the
Constitution practiced upon or acknowledged for a period of nearly forty
years, has received a national sanction not to be reversed but by an
evidence at least equivalent to the national will."
As to the precedence for nullification established by
the Virginia Resolution, which he had drafted, Madison rebutted this
argument by pointing out that he had called for the "states"
--plural -- to act in opposition to the Alien and Sedition
Acts and to proceed in ways compatible with the Constitution --
to either vote the offending party out of office or amend the Constitution
itself. The notion that a single state could nullify a federal law was
nonsensical to Madison: "For this preposterous and anarchical pretension
there is not a shadow of countenance in the Constitution."
The issue of nullification was further complicated for
Madison by Jefferson. Only months before his death, Jefferson penned
a letter to a Madison critic that appeared to buttress the assertion
that tariffs to protect native industries ran contrary to the Constitution.
Nullifiers made the letter public and used it to suit their aims. Such
use of Jefferson's name, especially as he was now dead, in support of
positions that Madison believed would have been anathema to Jefferson,
outraged him.
Early in 1829, he wrote to one correspondent: "The
inconsistency is monstrous between the professed veneration for [Jefferson's]
name and the anxiety to make him avow opinions in the most pointed opposition
to those maintained by him in his more deliberate correspondence with
others, and acted on through his whole official life."
Later that same year, Madison fumed that Jefferson's
"authority is made to weigh nothing, or outweigh everything, according
to the scale in which it is put." In 1832, frustrated, Madison
came as close as he ever did to criticizing his best friend, when he
wrote, "Allowance ... ought to be made for a habit in Mr. Jefferson,
as in others of great genius, of expressing in strong and round terms
impressions of the moment."
Though it would be misleading to suggest that James
Madison's letters and public pronouncements played a major role in resolving
the nullification crisis, his views effectively persuaded the state's
politicians to oppose nationalist John C. Calhoun's doctrine. In the
end, when South Carolina threatened secession in 1832, the ever-militant
Andrew Jackson kept the Union together, while statesman and former Secretary
of State Henry Clay engineered a successful compromise to reduce tariffs.
Madison sensed that if disunion undid the republic,
it would be enmeshed in the institution of slavery. Though a man of
inexhaustible faith and optimism in the common wisdom of a self-governing
people to choose the right and just course, Madison, "With regard
to slavery ... owned himself almost to be in despair," according
to Harriet Martineau, a visitor to Montpelier in 1835. An English feminist
and noted political economist fiercely opposed to slavery, Martineau
recalled that Madison "without limitation or hesitation" confirmed
to her all the evils of slavery. He told her that "the whole Bible
is against Negro slavery; but that the clergy do not preach this, and
the people do not see it."
The only hope he held out for abolishing slavery in
America was through the American Colonization Society. "Much to
Martineau's consternation," according to Madison biographer Drew
McCoy, "Madison believed that colonization [of freed blacks to
Africa] offered a gradual, longterm, but potentially feasible means
to eradicating slavery in the American republic." Why blacks could
not remain as freed men and women in America, Madison never explained
to Martineau, though he could have mentioned what he well knew --
that, in nearly every quarter of the continent settled by Europeans,
freed blacks faced open hostility.
Despite the impracticality of Madison's scheme and the
prevalent unwillingness of blacks -- including his own slaves
-- to go to Africa, Madison persisted in his delusion, even as
the society had colonized fewer than 3,000 freed slaves during 18 years,
while the annual slave population grew by 60,000. "How such a mind
as his could derive any alleviation to its anxiety from that source"
mystified Martineau.
In the end Madison was unable to resolve the scourge
of slavery for himself or for the republic he had helped found. To the
frustration of many who knew Madison and his disdain for slavery, he
(unlike George Washington) made no provision for emancipating his slaves
at his death, and left them to Dolley with his express "desire
that none of them should be sold without his or her consent."
Historians and scholars speculate about Madison's reasons
for doing what he did. Many think the dwindling revenues from his land
provoked him to do so, at the cost of his humanitarian instincts. Nonetheless,
the fact remains that Madison never undertook the practical steps that
might have augmented his income and allowed him to free his slaves.
Within a year of Martineau's visit to Montpelier, as
another Piedmont spring bloomed into summer, James Madison's faded,
until his death on June 28, 1836. The next day he was buried in the
family cemetery at Montpelier, in a graveside service attended by Dolley,
his manservant Paul Jennings, his other slaves, and neighbors, including
James Barbour. Some weeks later, Barbour described the scene by recalling
there had been a "profound silence ... now and then broken by sobs."
Seventeen years after Madison's death private subscriptions
were raised to erect an obelisk above his grave. Within only a few years
of that occasion, Confederate and Union troops passed near and through
Montpelier, as "the most important constitutional decision in our
nation's history was made by bayonets, not black-robed Justices of the
Supreme Court," in the words of biographer Robert Rutland.
Where would James Madison have stood in that conflict?
Would this native Virginian and slaveholder have gone to war to preserve
the union or perhaps engineered a compromise that preserved both the
union and slavery? In Madison's final message for the nation, published
after his death, only one issue is clear: "The advice nearest to
my heart and deepest in my convictions is that the union of the states
be cherished and perpetuated."
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