The Senate Continued
For the Independent Journal.
To the People of the State of New York:
A FIFTH desideratum, illustrating the utility
of a senate, is the want of a due sense of national character.
Without a select and stable member of the government, the esteem
of foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an unenlightened
and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already mentioned,
but the national councils will not possess that sensibility
to the opinion of the world, which is perhaps not less necessary
in order to merit, than it is to obtain, its respect and confidence.
An attention to the judgment of other nations
is important to every government for two reasons: the one is,
that, independently of the merits of any particular plan or
measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it should
appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable
policy; the second is, that in doubtful cases, particularly
where the national councils may be warped by some strong passion
or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the
impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed.
What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign
nations; and how many errors and follies would she not have
avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in
every instance, been previously tried by the light in which
they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind?
Yet however requisite a sense of national character
may be, it is evident that it can never be sufficiently possessed
by a numerous and changeable body. It can only be found in a
number so small that a sensible degree of the praise and blame
of public measures may be the portion of each individual; or
in an assembly so durably invested with public trust, that the
pride and consequence of its members may be sensibly incorporated
with the reputation and prosperity of the community. The half-yearly
representatives of Rhode Island would probably have been little
affected in their deliberations on the iniquitous measures of
that State, by arguments drawn from the light in which such
measures would be viewed by foreign nations, or even by the
sister States; whilst it can scarcely be doubted that if the
concurrence of a select and stable body had been necessary,
a regard to national character alone would have prevented the
calamities under which that misguided people is now laboring.
I add, as a SIXTH defect the want, in some important
cases, of a due responsibility in the government to the people,
arising from that frequency of elections which in other cases
produces this responsibility. This remark will, perhaps, appear
not only new, but paradoxical. It must nevertheless be acknowledged,
when explained, to be as undeniable as it is important.
Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, must
be limited to objects within the power of the responsible party,
and in order to be effectual, must relate to operations of that
power, of which a ready and proper judgment can be formed by
the constituents. The objects of government may be divided into
two general classes: the one depending on measures which have
singly an immediate and sensible operation; the other depending
on a succession of well-chosen and well-connected measures,
which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation. The importance
of the latter description to the collective and permanent welfare
of every country, needs no explanation. And yet it is evident
that an assembly elected for so short a term as to be unable
to provide more than one or two links in a chain of measures,
on which the general welfare may essentially depend, ought not
to be answerable for the final result, any more than a steward
or tenant, engaged for one year, could be justly made to answer
for places or improvements which could not be accomplished in
less than half a dozen years. Nor is it possible for the people
to estimate the SHARE of influence which their annual assemblies
may respectively have on events resulting from the mixed transactions
of several years. It is sufficiently difficult to preserve a
personal responsibility in the members of a NUMEROUS body (see
Constitution
1.2), for such acts of the body as have an immediate,
detached, and palpable operation on its constituents.
The proper remedy for this defect must be an additional
body in the legislative department, which, having sufficient
permanency (see Constitution
1.3) to provide for such objects as require a continued
attention, and a train of measures, may be justly and effectually
answerable for the attainment of those objects.
Thus far I have considered the circumstances which
point out the necessity of a well-constructed Senate only as
they relate to the representatives of the people. To a people
as little blinded by prejudice or corrupted by flattery as those
whom I address, I shall not scruple to add, that such an institution
may be sometimes necessary as a defense to the people against
their own temporary errors and delusions. As the cool and deliberate
sense of the community ought, in all governments, and actually
will, in all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views
of its rulers; so there are particular moments in public affairs
when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some
illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations
of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves
will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In
these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference
of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order
to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated
by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and
truth can regain their authority over the public mind? What
bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often escaped
if their government had contained so provident a safeguard against
the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then
have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same
citizens the hemlock on one day and statues on the next.
It may be suggested, that a people spread over
an extensive region cannot, like the crowded inhabitants of
a small district, be subject to the infection of violent passions,
or to the danger of combining in pursuit of unjust measures.
I am far from denying that this is a distinction of peculiar
importance. I have, on the contrary, endeavored in a former
paper to show, that it is one of the principal recommendations
of a confederated republic. At the same time, this advantage
ought not to be considered as superseding the use of auxiliary
precautions. It may even be remarked, that the same extended
situation, which will exempt the people of America from some
of the dangers incident to lesser republics, will expose them
to the inconveniency of remaining for a longer time under the
influence of those misrepresentations which the combined industry
of interested men may succeed in distributing among them.
It adds no small weight to all these considerations,
to recollect that history informs us of no long-lived republic
which had not a senate. Sparta, Rome, and Carthage are, in fact,
the only states to whom that character can be applied. In each
of the two first there was a senate for life. The constitution
of the senate in the last is less known. Circumstantial evidence
makes it probable that it was not different in this particular
from the two others. It is at least certain, that it had some
quality or other which rendered it an anchor against popular
fluctuations; and that a smaller council, drawn out of the senate,
was appointed not only for life, but filled up vacancies itself.
These examples, though as unfit for the imitation, as they are
repugnant to the genius, of America, are, notwithstanding, when
compared with the fugitive and turbulent existence of other
ancient republics, very instructive proofs of the necessity
of some institution that will blend stability with liberty.
I am not unaware of the circumstances which distinguish the
American from other popular governments, as well ancient as
modern; and which render extreme circumspection necessary, in
reasoning from the one case to the other. But after allowing
due weight to this consideration, it may still be maintained,
that there are many points of similitude which render these
examples not unworthy of our attention. Many of the defects,
as we have seen, which can only be supplied by a senatorial
institution, are common to a numerous assembly frequently elected
by the people, and to the people themselves. There are others
peculiar to the former, which require the control of such an
institution. The people can never wilfully betray their own
interests; but they may possibly be betrayed by the representatives
of the people; and the danger will be evidently greater where
the whole legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one body
of men, than where the concurrence of separate and dissimilar
bodies is required in every public act.
The difference most relied on, between the American
and other republics, consists in the principle of representation;
which is the pivot on which the former move, and which is supposed
to have been unknown to the latter, or at least to the ancient
part of them. The use which has been made of this difference,
in reasonings contained in former papers, will have shown that
I am disposed neither to deny its existence nor to undervalue
its importance. I feel the less restraint, therefore, in observing,
that the position concerning the ignorance of the ancient governments
on the subject of representation, is by no means precisely true
in the latitude commonly given to it. Without entering into
a disquisition which here would be misplaced, I will refer to
a few known facts, in support of what I advance.
In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of
the executive functions were performed, not by the people themselves,
but by officers elected by the people, and REPRESENTING the
people in their EXECUTIVE capacity.
Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed
by nine Archons, annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE AT LARGE. The
degree of power delegated to them seems to be left in great
obscurity. Subsequent to that period, we find an assembly, first
of four, and afterwards of six hundred members, annually ELECTED
BY THE PEOPLE; and PARTIALLY representing them in their LEGISLATIVE
capacity, since they were not only associated with the people
in the function of making laws, but had the exclusive right
of originating legislative propositions to the people. The senate
of Carthage, also, whatever might be its power, or the duration
of its appointment, appears to have been ELECTIVE by the suffrages
of the people. Similar instances might be traced in most, if
not all the popular governments of antiquity.
Lastly, in Sparta we meet with the Ephori, and
in Rome with the Tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in numbers,
but annually ELECTED BY THE WHOLE BODY OF THE PEOPLE, and considered
as the REPRESENTATIVES of the people, almost in their PLENIPOTENTIARY
capacity. The Cosmi of Crete were also annually ELECTED BY THE
PEOPLE, and have been considered by some authors as an institution
analogous to those of Sparta and Rome, with this difference
only, that in the election of that representative body the right
of suffrage was communicated to a part only of the people.
From these facts, to which many others might be
added, it is clear that the principle of representation was
neither unknown to the ancients nor wholly overlooked in their
political constitutions. The true distinction between these
and the American governments, lies IN THE TOTAL EXCLUSION OF
THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR COLLECTIVE CAPACITY, from any share in
the LATTER, and not in the TOTAL EXCLUSION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE PEOPLE from the administration of the FORMER. The distinction,
however, thus qualified, must be admitted to leave a most advantageous
superiority in favor of the United States. But to insure to
this advantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate
it from the other advantage, of an extensive territory. For
it cannot be believed, that any form of representative government
could have succeeded within the narrow limits occupied by the
democracies of Greece.
In answer to all these arguments, suggested by
reason, illustrated by examples, and enforced by our own experience,
the jealous adversary of the Constitution will probably content
himself with repeating, that a senate appointed not immediately
by the people, and for the term of six years, must gradually
acquire a dangerous pre-eminence in the government, and finally
transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy.
To this general answer, the general reply ought
to be sufficient, that liberty may be endangered by the abuses
of liberty as well as by the abuses of power; that there are
numerous instances of the former as well as of the latter; and
that the former, rather than the latter, are apparently most
to be apprehended by the United States. But a more particular
reply may be given.
Before such a revolution can be effected, the
Senate, it is to be observed, must in the first place corrupt
itself; must next corrupt the State legislatures; must then
corrupt the House of Representatives; and must finally corrupt
the people at large. It is evident that the Senate must be first
corrupted before it can attempt an establishment of tyranny.
Without corrupting the State legislatures, it cannot prosecute
the attempt, because the periodical change of members would
otherwise regenerate the whole body. Without exerting the means
of corruption with equal success on the House of Representatives,
the opposition of that coequal branch of the government would
inevitably defeat the attempt; and without corrupting the people
themselves, a succession of new representatives would speedily
restore all things to their pristine order. Is there any man
who can seriously persuade himself that the proposed Senate
can, by any possible means within the compass of human address,
arrive at the object of a lawless ambition, through all these
obstructions?
If reason condemns the suspicion, the same sentence
is pronounced by experience. The constitution of Maryland furnishes
the most apposite example. The Senate of that State is elected,
as the federal Senate will be, indirectly by the people, and
for a term less by one year only than the federal Senate. It
is distinguished, also, by the remarkable prerogative of filling
up its own vacancies within the term of its appointment, and,
at the same time, is not under the control of any such rotation
as is provided for the federal Senate. There are some other
lesser distinctions, which would expose the former to colorable
objections, that do not lie against the latter. If the federal
Senate, therefore, really contained the danger which has been
so loudly proclaimed, some symptoms at least of a like danger
ought by this time to have been betrayed by the Senate of Maryland,
but no such symptoms have appeared. On the contrary, the jealousies
at first entertained by men of the same description with those
who view with terror the correspondent part of the federal Constitution,
have been gradually extinguished by the progress of the experiment;
and the Maryland constitution is daily deriving, from the salutary
operation of this part of it, a reputation in which it will
probably not be rivalled by that of any State in the Union.
But if any thing could silence the jealousies
on this subject, it ought to be the British example. The Senate
there instead of being elected for a term of six years, and
of being unconfined to particular families or fortunes, is an
hereditary assembly of opulent nobles. The House of Representatives,
instead of being elected for two years, and by the whole body
of the people, is elected for seven years, and, in very great
proportion, by a very small proportion of the people. Here,
unquestionably, ought to be seen in full display the aristocratic
usurpations and tyranny which are at some future period to be
exemplified in the United States. Unfortunately, however, for
the anti-federal argument, the British history informs us that
this hereditary assembly has not been able to defend itself
against the continual encroachments of the House of Representatives;
and that it no sooner lost the support of the monarch, than
it was actually crushed by the weight of the popular branch.
As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject,
its examples support the reasoning which we have employed. In
Sparta, the Ephori, the annual representatives of the people,
were found an overmatch for the senate for life, continually
gained on its authority and finally drew all power into their
own hands. The Tribunes of Rome, who were the representatives
of the people, prevailed, it is well known, in almost every
contest with the senate for life, and in the end gained the
most complete triumph over it. The fact is the more remarkable,
as unanimity was required in every act of the Tribunes, even
after their number was augmented to ten. It proves the irresistible
force possessed by that branch of a free government, which has
the people on its side. To these examples might be added that
of Carthage, whose senate, according to the testimony of Polybius,
instead of drawing all power into its vortex, had, at the commencement
of the second Punic War, lost almost the whole of its original
portion.
Besides the conclusive evidence resulting from
this assemblage of facts, that the federal Senate will never
be able to transform itself, by gradual usurpations, into an
independent and aristocratic body, we are warranted in believing,
that if such a revolution should ever happen from causes which
the foresight of man cannot guard against, the House of Representatives,
with the people on their side, will at all times be able to
bring back the Constitution to its primitive form and principles.
Against the force of the immediate representatives of the people,
nothing will be able to maintain even the constitutional authority
of the Senate, but such a display of enlightened policy, and
attachment to the public good, as will divide with that branch
of the legislature the affections and support of the entire
body of the people themselves.
PUBLIUS
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