The Same Subject Continued (The House
of Representatives)
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 12, 1788.
To the People of the State of New York:
I SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation,
"that where annual elections end, tyranny begins. ''If
it be true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which become
proverbial are generally founded in reason, it is not less true,
that when once established, they are often applied to cases
to which the reason of them does not extend. I need not look
for a proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason on
which this proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject
himself to the ridicule of pretending that any natural connection
subsists between the sun or the seasons, and the period within
which human virtue can bear the temptations of power. Happily
for mankind, liberty is not, in this respect, confined to any
single point of time; but lies within extremes, which afford
sufficient latitude for all the variations which may be required
by the various situations and circumstances of civil society.
The election of magistrates might be, if it were found expedient,
as in some instances it actually has been, daily, weekly, or
monthly, as well as annual; and if circumstances may require
a deviation from the rule on one side, why not also on the other
side? Turning our attention to the periods established among
ourselves, for the election of the most numerous branches of
the State legislatures, we find them by no means coinciding
any more in this instance, than in the elections of other civil
magistrates. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, the periods are
half-yearly. In the other States, South Carolina excepted, they
are annual. In South Carolina they are biennial as is proposed
in the federal government. Here is a difference, as four to
one, between the longest and shortest periods; and yet it would
be not easy to show, that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better
governed, or enjoys a greater share of rational liberty, than
South Carolina; or that either the one or the other of these
States is distinguished in these respects, and by these causes,
from the States whose elections are different from both.
In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I can discover
but one, and that is wholly inapplicable to our case. The important
distinction so well understood in America, between a Constitution
established by the people and unalterable by the government,
and a law established by the government and alterable by the
government, seems to have been little understood and less observed
in any other country. Wherever the supreme power of legislation
has resided, has been supposed to reside also a full power to
change the form of the government. Even in Great Britain, where
the principles of political and civil liberty have been most
discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the Constitution,
it is maintained that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent
and uncontrollable, as well with regard to the Constitution,
as the ordinary objects of legislative provision. They have
accordingly, in several instances, actually changed, by legislative
acts, some of the most fundamental articles of the government.
They have in particular, on several occasions, changed the period
of election; and, on the last occasion, not only introduced
septennial in place of triennial elections, but by the same
act, continued themselves in place four years beyond the term
for which they were elected by the people. An attention to these
dangerous practices has produced a very natural alarm in the
votaries of free government, of which frequency of elections
is the corner-stone; and has led them to seek for some security
to liberty, against the danger to which it is exposed. Where
no Constitution, paramount to the government, either existed
or could be obtained, no constitutional security, similar to
that established in the United States, was to be attempted.
Some other security, therefore, was to be sought for; and what
better security would the case admit, than that of selecting
and appealing to some simple and familiar portion of time, as
a standard for measuring the danger of innovations, for fixing
the national sentiment, and for uniting the patriotic exertions?
The most simple and familiar portion of time, applicable to
the subject was that of a year; and hence the doctrine has been
inculcated by a laudable zeal, to erect some barrier against
the gradual innovations of an unlimited government, that the
advance towards tyranny was to be calculated by the distance
of departure from the fixed point of annual elections. But what
necessity can there be of applying this expedient to a government
limited, as the federal government will be, by the authority
of a paramount Constitution? Or who will pretend that the liberties
of the people of America will not be more secure under biennial
elections, unalterably fixed by such a Constitution, than those
of any other nation would be, where elections were annual, or
even more frequent, but subject to alterations by the ordinary
power of the government?
The second question stated is, whether biennial elections be
necessary or useful. The propriety of answering this question
in the affirmative will appear from several very obvious considerations.
No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an
upright intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge
of the subjects on which he is to legislate. A part of this
knowledge may be acquired by means of information which lie
within the compass of men in private as well as public stations.
Another part can only be attained, or at least thoroughly attained,
by actual experience in the station which requires the use of
it. The period of service, ought, therefore, in all such cases,
to bear some proportion to the extent of practical knowledge
requisite to the due performance of the service. The period
of legislative service established in most of the States for
the more numerous branch is, as we have seen, one year. The
question then may be put into this simple form: does the period
of two years bear no greater proportion to the knowledge requisite
for federal legislation than one year does to the knowledge
requisite for State legislation? The very statement of the question,
in this form, suggests the answer that ought to be given to
it.
In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to the existing
laws which are uniform throughout the State, and with which
all the citizens are more or less conversant; and to the general
affairs of the State, which lie within a small compass, are
not very diversified, and occupy much of the attention and conversation
of every class of people. The great theatre of the United States
presents a very different scene. The laws are so far from being
uniform, that they vary in every State; whilst the public affairs
of the Union are spread throughout a very extensive region,
and are extremely diversified by t e local affairs connected
with them, and can with difficulty be correctly learnt in any
other place than in the central councils to which a knowledge
of them will be brought by the representatives of every part
of the empire. Yet some knowledge of the affairs, and even of
the laws, of all the States, ought to be possessed by the members
from each of the States. How can foreign trade be properly regulated
by uniform laws, without some acquaintance with the commerce,
the ports, the usages, and the regulatious of the different
States? How can the trade between the different States be duly
regulated, without some knowledge of their relative situations
in these and other respects? How can taxes be judiciously imposed
and effectually collected, if they be not accommodated to the
different laws and local circumstances relating to these objects
in the different States? How can uniform regulations for the
militia be duly provided, without a similar knowledge of many
internal circumstances by which the States are distinguished
from each other? These are the principal objects of federal
legislation, and suggest most forcibly the extensive information
which the representatives ought to acquire. The other interior
objects will require a proportional degree of information with
regard to them.
It is true that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be
very much diminished. The most laborious task will be the proper
inauguration of the government and the primeval formation of
a federal code. Improvements on the first draughts will every
year become both easier and fewer. Past transactions of the
government will be a ready and accurate source of information
to new members. The affairs of the Union will become more and
more objects of curiosity and conversation among the citizens
at large. And the increased intercourse among those of different
States will contribute not a little to diffuse a mutual knowledge
of their affairs, as this again will contribute to a general
assimilation of their manners and laws. But with all these abatements,
the business of federal legislation must continue so far to
exceed, both in novelty and difficulty, the legislative business
of a single State, as to justify the longer period of service
assigned to those who are to transact it.
A branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of
a federal representative, and which has not been mentioned is
that of foreign affairs. In regulating our own commerce he ought
to be not only acquainted with the treaties between the United
States and other nations, but also with the commercial policy
and laws of other nations. He ought not to be altogether ignorant
of the law of nations; for that, as far as it is a proper object
of municipal legislation, is submitted to the federal government.
And although the House of Representatives is not immediately
to participate in foreign negotiations and arrangements, yet
from the necessary connection between the several branches of
public affairs, those particular branches will frequently deserve
attention in the ordinary course of legislation, and will sometimes
demand particular legislative sanction and co-operation. Some
portion of this knowledge may, no doubt, be acquired in a man's
closet; but some of it also can only be derived from the public
sources of information; and all of it will be acquired to best
effect by a practical attention to the subject during the period
of actual service in the legislature.
There are other considerations, of less importance, perhaps,
but which are not unworthy of notice. The distance which many
of the representatives will be obliged to travel, and the arrangements
rendered necessary by that circumstance, might be much more
serious objections with fit men to this service, if limited
to a single year, than if extended to two years. No argument
can be drawn on this subject, from the case of the delegates
to the existing Congress. They are elected annually, it is true;
but their re-election is considered by the legislative assemblies
almost as a matter of course. The election of the representatives
by the people would not be governed by the same principle.
A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will
possess superior talents; will, by frequent reelections, become
members of long standing; will be thoroughly masters of the
public business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves
of those advantages. The greater the proportion of new members,
and the less the information of the bulk of the members the
more apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid
for them. This remark is no less applicable to the relation
which will subsist between the House of Representatives and
the Senate.
It is an inconvenience mingled with the advantages of our frequent
elections even in single States, where they are large, and hold
but one legislative session in a year, that spurious elections
cannot be investigated and annulled in time for the decision
to have its due effect. If a return can be obtained, no matter
by what unlawful means, the irregular member, who takes his
seat of course, is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer
his purposes. Hence, a very pernicious encouragement is given
to the use of unlawful means, for obtaining irregular returns.
Were elections for the federal legislature to be annual, this
practice might become a very serious abuse, particularly in
the more distant States. Each house is, as it necessarily must
be, the judge of the elections, qualifications, and returns
of its members; and whatever improvements may be suggested by
experience, for simplifying and accelerating the process in
disputed cases, so great a portion of a year would unavoidably
elapse, before an illegitimate member could be dispossessed
of his seat, that the prospect of such an event would be little
check to unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat.
All these considerations taken together warrant us in affirming,
that biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of
the public as we have seen that they will be safe to the liberty
of the people.
PUBLIUS
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